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I. INTRODUCTION
The regulation of the commercial nuclear power industry in the
United States is experiencing a radical transformation caused by
dramatic changes in nuclear power markets and politics. Nuclear
power, once the hope and envy of energy suppliers, has been a
costly mistake.1 For nearly a decade, no one has invested in new
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law, Professor of Law, Univer-
sity of Cincinnati College of Law. A.B., University of Notre Dame; J.D., George Washington
University. This Article is a modified version of three chapters of a book entitled Nuclear
Power Transformation to be published by Indiana University Press in 1987. The authors
thank Professor Ian MacNeil and Professor Richard Pierce for reading and commenting on
a previous version of this Article. The authors also thank Melinda Blatt for her excellent
research assistance.
** B.A., Brown University; J.D., University of Cincinnati.
1. Professor Richard Pierce defines a mistake or a "mistake in retrospect" as a project
"that would not have been initiated ten years ago if the sponsors had known then what they
know today." Pierce, The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect: Canceled
Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. R.v. 497, 498 (1984). Everyone has 20-20 hind-
sight, however, so few of us would make such mistakes. Furthermore, Pierce's definition
applies to the behavior of utilities in investing in nuclear power. This Article uses a broader
definition of mistake and applies it to government as well as industry. The nuclear mistake
was an over-ambitious government and industry joint venture that was insensitive to eco-
nomic and political factors, thus raising costs beyond what the market could bear. The mis-
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domestic nuclear plants. Instead, regulation is occupied with ex-
isting and nearly on-line plants. Furthermore, the nuclear transi-
tion has uncovered unanticipated costs attributable to emergency
evacuation, plant decommissioning, and waste disposal. Society is
now in the process of identifying and allocating these costs. The
consequence of these changes is clear. No more nuclear power
plant construction will occur in the United States until costs are
lowered and industry safety claims receive wide public acceptance.
These twin conditions are necessary for any reemergence of nu-
clear power. This Article addresses the economic and political dis-
placement and realignment of nuclear regulation during the period
of transition from the traditional model of regulation to the emerg-
ing post-industrial model.
The nuclear transition is not discrete; the government did not
announce and implement a conscious policy change.' Instead, the
change is largely unconscious and is taking place gradually. The
transition dates from March 28, 1979, the date of the incident at
Three Mile Island, to April 26, 1986, the date of the Chernobyl
accident. TMI and Chernobyl serve as more than convenient mile-
posts in the history of nuclear power. These accidents are stark
reminders of the complexities, risks, and costs of government spon-
sored and regulated enterprises. Furthermore, and more impor-
take manifested itself in investments in plants that were either cancelled or added to excess
electrical production capacity, and whose construction costs were grossly underestimated.
See infra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
2. In an article about legal transition, Professor Louis Kaplow argues that for government
to provide relief for changes in policy is inefficient. In explicating his thesis, he makes, then
relaxes, two assumptions: "First, the analysis assumes that the transition policy to be em-
ployed in a given context is well-known in advance and will be followed consistently in the
future . . . . Second, the discussion assumes that the reforms themselves are desirable at
the time they are made." Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARv. L.
REv. 509, 520-21 (1986). Furthermore, Kaplow's heuristic analysis of legal transition de-
pends on a discrete event. Policy X exists at Time One, and then policy Y governs at Time
Two. Id. at 607. He uses tax reforms and eminent domain takings as examples. Id. at 602.
This Article's analysis of transition relies on neither assumption. The transition policy is
unknown; hence, its desirability is likewise unknown. Moreover, the transition is not dis-
crete; it takes place over a period of time. The nuclear policy that existed from World War
II until 1979 is being replaced by an as yet unacknowledged emerging nuclear policy. This
Article concentrates on the developmental period for nuclear policy after 1979.
Despite the differences in assumptions and models, this Article reaches the same conclu-
sion as Kaplow regarding government relief: Transitional relief is inefficient and perpetuates
a wrong set of signals about risks and incentives in the nuclear and electricity markets.
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tantly, the events that occurred between these dates have signifi-
cantly changed the direction of the nuclear and electric industries.
Two overriding characteristics comprise the nuclear transition.'
The first is a shift in emphasis from safety to finances. 4 The pri-
mary fallout from TMI was financial, not radioactive. In contrast,
the real radioactive fallout of Chernobyl can serve as the catalyst
refocusing attention on safety.5 The second characteristic is the de-
centralization of decision making away from the central govern-
ment toward the states, best exemplified in Pacific Gas & Electric
Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development
Commission.$ Together, these market and political forces combine
to alter nuclear regulation.
Prior to TMI, commercial nuclear power enjoyed wide and at
times uniform support. The government saw commercialization as
a way to expand the country's technological superiority, the indus-
try saw nuclear power as a source of great profits, and the public
saw cheap and nearly inexhaustible energy. People assumed that
nuclear plants were safe and that safety was affordable because of
the great economies of scale that nuclear plants offered. At that
point, however, the country underwent a loss of faith in nuclear
3. The two themes of the transition are developed more extensively in Tomain, Law and
Policy in the Activist State: Rethinking Nuclear Regulation, 38 RUTGERS L. REV. 187, 201-
12 (1986); Tomain, Nuclear Regulation in Transition, 17 PROGRESS IN NucLEAR ENERGY 245
(1986).
4. Safety issues did not evaporate although they did seem to take a back seat during this
period. See UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, SAFETY SECOND: A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE
NRC's FIRST DECADE (1987).
5. The initial industry and government reactions to the Chernobyl accident expressed
concern for safety. Soon, however, it was business as usual for the domestic nuclear indus-
try. See Hearing before the Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, S. Hrg. 99-869, 99th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 2, 31 (1986) (testimony of Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission) ("Based on the information
available to us now, we have concluded no immediate changes in our regulatory practices
and policies are necessary."); Gauging the Fallout from Chernobyl, PuB. UTM FORT., May
29, 1986, at 44, 44 ("Despite these concerns, the Chernobyl disaster has had little substan-
tive short-term effect on commercial nuclear power in this country.").
6. 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
7. The uniform acceptance of a promotional nuclear policy is standard regulatory history.
See, e.g., G. MAZUZAN & J. WALKER, CONTROLLING THE ATOm THE BEGINNINGS OF NUCLEAR
REGULATION 1946-1962 (1985). This is the "official" history of nuclear regulation commis-
sioned by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. See also Lanouette, Atomic Energy, 1945-
1985, WILSON Q., Winter 1985, at 91.
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power. This loss of faith was not only a metaphorical abandon-
ment, it was also an actual abandonment expressed through plant
cancellations. It manifested itself in the marketplace as financing
for new plants dried up. Concomitant with market failure was bu-
reaucratic failure. The loss of faith also extended to a disenchant-
ment with centralized decision making. The traditional expertise
model of bureaucracy8 gave way as the states gained decision-mak-
ing authority. These factors became the essence of the nuclear
transition.
This Article explores the lessons of the nuclear transition. Part
II describes the nuclear market and the signs of fatigue. Part III
discusses the political and regulatory responses to market failure.
Decision makers 9 were simply unwilling, perhaps unable, to let nu-
clear power die a natural market death. Instead, the regulatory
system almost uniformly accommodated the weakening financial
condition of the nuclear industry by apportioning losses between
ratepayers and shareholders rather than letting the industry ab-
sorb all losses. Transitional relief through loss allocation to rate-
payers is not defensible from an economic standpoint because the
accommodations skew the risks and incentives of nuclear regula-
tion and promote inefficient over-investment. 10 The accommoda-
tions are understandable politically, however, as explained in Part
IV. Briefly, nuclear market failure and the political responses it
engendered have demonstrated the need for a new regulatory
model. Even though the de facto government relief accorded the
industry has delayed what is most likely an inevitable change in
8. See, e.g., Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Life, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1277,
1318-34 (1984) (discussing the "expertise" model); Stewart, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1169, 1671-88 (1975) (discussing the "traditional"
model).
9. Decisions affecting nuclear power are made at every level and by every branch of gov-
ernment. State utility commissions and state judges made most of the decisions discussed in
this Article. Still, the reader must realize that a variety of decision makers exist and that
"nuclear policy" is not delineated by any one decision maker. Rather, it is the result of a
complex policy-making process. See generally Tomain, Institutionalized Conflicts Between
Law and Policy, 22 Hous. L. REV. 661 (1985) (discussing the decision-making difficulties
that arise because of the conflict between law and policy).
10. See Averch & Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM.
EcoN. REV. 1052 (Dec. 1962); Kaplow, supra note 2, at 527-32. See generally Quinn & Tre-
bilcock, Compensation, Transition Costs, and Regulatory Change, 32 U. TORONTO L.J. 117
(1982) (efficiency gains from transition relief are indeterminate).
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utility regulation, the accommodations have forced policy makers
to question basic assumptions. The traditional capital-expansionist
model of utility regulation that has existed for the last century
must be replaced by a more competitive market-centered post-in-
dustrial model. The transition exposed the weaknesses of the tradi-
tional model and revealed the contours of the next era of nuclear
power and electricity regulation. The consequences of nuclear tran-
sition range widely beyond changes in administrative agency regu-
lations and affect federal and state regulation of nuclear power, the
delivery and regulation of electricity, and the relationship of gov-
ernment and industry in a high-technology world.
II. THE NUCLEAR POWER MARKET
A. Introduction
The unequivocal message from the marketplace is that the nu-
clear industry is dead.11 Given the billions of dollars invested over
the last four decades, one wonders if this obituary is premature.2
Nevertheless, the poor financial health of the nuclear industry was
real. The industry has resuscitated itself financially by appealing
to regulators. The central insight about nuclear power and its regu-
lation is that the bureaucratic state created the nuclear market.
That market no longer functions smoothly, however, and its failure
has resulted in an uneven and'unfair distribution of risks and costs
and an inefficient set of incentives.
Because the nuclear industry is nonintegrated in that no one
type of firm controls the entire fuel cycle from mining to electricity
distribution, studying a single entity or group of entities is inaccu-
11. See, e.g., Cook, Nuclear Follies, FORBES, Feb. 11, 1985, at 82.
12. See M. HERTSGAARD, NUCLEAR, INC. THE MEN AND MONEY BEHIND NUCLEAR ENERGY 7
(1983) (asserting that $400 billion was spent in 1981); Rodgers & Gray, State Commission
Treatment of Nuclear Plant Cancellation Costs, 13 HoFSTRA L. REv. 443, 443 n.3 (1985).
Regarding a reemergence of nuclear power, see TECHNOLOGY FuTUREs, INC. & ScIETIFIC
FORESIGHT, INC., PRINCIPLES FOR ELECTRIC POWER POLICY ch. II (1984) [hereinafter PRINCI-
PLES FOR ELECTRIC POWER POLICY]; Klueh, A Second Nuclear Era?, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Oct.
31, 1985, at 15; Sillin, Managing to Reduce Nuclear Financial Risks, Pun. UTn.. FORT., Oct.
11, 1984, at 26. Nuclear power may reemerge if a large reindustrialization of the economy
occurs that requires mega-plants, or, more likely, if utilities build smaller, cheaper plants
and nuclear power increases in its public acceptability. For a discussion of the importance of
public acceptance, see Finger, Public Approval of Nuclear Power: Beyond the Short Term,
Pun. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 7, 1985, at 15.
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rate. The primary actors in the nuclear financial drama, however,
are investor-owned utilities, which generate about eighty percent
of the country's electricity, fourteen percent of which is nuclear.1"
Utilities make the initial decision to build the plants, then enter
into contracts with reactor vendors, architects, engineers, and con-
tractors to equip, design, and build the plants. Consequently, with-
out power plant orders the bottom falls out of the nuclear indus-
try. This collapse has happened. No new nuclear plants have been
ordered since 1978, and all plants ordered since 1974 have been
cancelled."4
Another clarification about the nuclear industry is necessary. No
utilities are committed exclusively to generating electricity from
nuclear power. Instead, electric utilities wisely use a mix of fuels.1 5
Thus, the health of nuclear utilities is interdependent with the
health of the electric utility that has chosen to go nuclear.16 Conse-
quently, to understand the nuclear market, one must understand
the market for electricity.
Public utilities occupy an odd status in a capitalist democracy.
As regulated firms, they are caught between political and market
forces and must serve two masters. They must satisfy the demands
of the market in their attempts to raise capital, and they must sat-
isfy the service obligation imposed upon them by government. At
the same time, they are measured against comparable competitive
industries and are partially insulated from market risks. Utilities,
thus, are primarily privately owned and are publicly regulated. The
private/market, public/nonmarket nature of nuclear utilities un-
13. Federal, state, local, and cooperative utilities generate the remainder. W. Fox, FED-
ERAL REGULATION OF ENERGY § 30.01 (1983); see also P. JOSKOW & R. SCHMALENSEE, MAR-
KETS FOR POWER. AN ANALYSIS OF ELECTRIC UTILITY DEREGULATION 12, tables 2.1 & 2.2
(1983).
14. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NUCLEAR PLANT CANCELLATIONS:
CAUSES, COSTS, AND CONSEQUENCES ch. 2 (1983) [hereinafter NUCLEAR PLANT CANCELLA-
TIONS]; see also ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, U.S. COMMERCIAL NU-
CLEAR PowEL HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, CURRENT STATUS AND OUTLOOK 10, table 1 (1982).
15. In 1981, for example, electricity was produced: by coal (52%), natural gas (15%), nu-
clear (12%), hydropower (11%), oil (9%), and by other sources (1%). W. Fox, supra note
13, at 750.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 45-103 (comparing nuclear and non-nuclear utili-
ties). This Article distinguishes between these two types based on utility construction. Utili-
ties with active nuclear construction programs are denoted as nuclear utilities. See infra
note 46.
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derscores the political and economic dimensions of utility regula-
tion. In an attempt to unravel the mixed nature of nuclear power,
this Part discusses the economic assumptions, financial indicators,
and rate-making principles behind nuclear regulation.
B. Economic Structure
In a competitive market, numerous buyers and sellers exchange
numerous substitutable goods so as to maximize productive and al-
locative efficiencies and to encourage innovation.17 The most de-
sired products at the most desired prices stay in the market, while
other products drop out. Due to various imperfections, however,
not all markets are competitive.18
The nuclear power market has three notable imperfections.
First, commercial nuclear power could not exist without govern-
ment financial sponsorship. The nuclear market did not, and
would not, exist of its own accord. Government support is known
as rationalization.19 Second, firms lack incentives to internalize
harmful externalities, 0 at least in the short run. Utility A, accord-
ing to theory, has little or no incentive to increase the costs of
safety improvements over utility B, or to expand public participa-
tion in decision making, if higher costs reduce its profits. Rational-
ization and the problem of harmful externalities are not unrelated.
The government displacement of the market creates other imper-
fections and necessitates corrective actions. Rationalization creates
direct and indirect subsidies that encourage entrants into the nu-
17. A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: COMPETITION, COORDINATION, AND
CONTROL 39-80 (1969).
18. See generally S. BmEYR, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15-35 (1982) (examples of mar-
ket failure including monopoly, inadequate information, spillovers, economic rents, excessive
competition, unequal bargaining power, moral hazard, and scarcity).
19. Id. at 33. "Occasionally governmental intervention is justified on the ground that,
without it, firms in an industry would remain too small or would lack sufficient organization
to produce their product efficiently." Id; see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978). In its discussion of the constitutionality of the Price-Ander-
son Act, the Court found as a matter of law that the private nuclear industry would not
exist without government support in the form of the enactment and implementation of the
Price-Anderson Act. Id. at 77-78.
20. An externality can be defined as a cost (or benefit) that is not recognized in the unreg-
ulated price of a good or service. S. BREYER, supra note 18, at 23. With nuclear power, many
safety problems, including the costs of lowering the probabilities of high risk events, are
externalities. As such, they impose costs that, but for regulation, society would bear.
1987]
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clear market. These entrants, in turn, necessitate safety regulations
to force nuclear utilities to internalize their externalities.
The regulation of electric utilities is based on a third market
failure. Historically, utilities were perceived as natural monopo-
lies.21 The economic sin of monopoly power is that a monopoly can
reduce output, raise prices, and cause a loss of consumer surplus
all at the same time.22 Electric utilities are highly capital-intensive;
a utility must invest three or four dollars in a plant to produce one
dollar of revenue. 3 In any given service area, a utility must build a
generating station or buy electricity, and then must transmit the
electricity through power lines to users. If two utilities began com-
peting in the same service area, the loser will have invested unnec-
essary capital because the additional plant and equipment will go
unused, thus creating economic waste.24 One way to avoid duplica-
tion-waste-of fixed capital assets-plant and equipment-is to
limit entry to a single provider by conferring monopoly status on a
utility. Encouraging only one optimum-size producer in a market is
considered highly desirable under these circumstances. 25 Although
it may seem counterintuitive, governments historically have fought
the harms attributed to natural monopolies by allowing state-pro-
tected monopolies. Instead of promoting competition in the elec-
tric industry, the state simply conferred monopoly status on a firm,
thus precluding new entrants. This monopoly-granting strategy
prevented short-term waste at the expense of long-term
competition.
In addition to waste avoidance, states conferred monopoly status
on utilities in the belief that a high fixed-cost, capital-intensive in-
dustry enjoyed economies of scale. As firms expand production, by
21. For a discussion of natural monopolies, see K. HOWE & E. RASMUSSEN, PUBLIC UTILITY
ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 19 (1982); 1 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES
AND INSTITUTIONS 11-12 (1970). The existence of a "natural monopoly" in the electricity
industry is not accepted by all economists. See, e.g., Collins, Electric Utility Rate Regula-
tion: Curing Economic Shortcomings Through Competition, 19 TULSA L.J. 141 (1983).
22. S. BREYER, supra note 18, at 15-16.
23. L. HYMAN, AMERICA'S ELECTRIC UTILITIES: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 199-200 (2d ed.
1985); see also PRINCIPLES FOR ELECTRIC POWER POLICY, supra note 12, at ch. V.
24. Contra W. PRIMEAUX, DIRECT ELECTRIC UTILITY COMPETITION ch. 4 (1986) (no evidence
of waste in a duopoly market).
25. C. PHILLIPS, THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 41 (1984).
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building more plants, the cost per unit of output decreases.26 An-
other cost reductive measure is technological improvement. As
plant designs became more sophisticated and efficient, production
costs decreased. Nuclear technology, for example, promised signifi-
cant savings in the cost of fuel. Even though a nuclear plant is
more costly to build than other plants, fuel savings promised to
offset construction costs.2 7
Nuclear utilities were therefore attractive to legislatures because
the utilities promised reduced costs through economies of scale
and technological improvements. In addition, courts and adminis-
trative agencies believed that the production of electricity was in
the public interest and that government regulation could assure its
delivery at the lowest cost." The importance of the public interest
rationale for utility regulation must be underscored. Utility regula-
tion is at least as political as it is economic.2 9 Talking about utility
regulation in economic terms alone is impossible. Viewing electric-
ity as a socially desirable commodity is the political justification
for government economic regulation; the natural monopoly ration-
ale is the economic justification for the exercise of political power.
As a result, several supply characteristics for electricity-and
nuclear power-production can be identified: high fixed costs,
long-run economies of scale, and technological improvements.
Combined with an expanding economy and a belief in a direct
GNP-energy link,30 these characteristics have the effect of lowering
the per unit price of a kilowatt of electricity. Simply put, the larger
the utility, the lower its production costs and the cheaper its prod-
uct. Large central power stations with monopoly protection per-
26. See generally Starr & Yu, The Role of Centralized Energy in National Energy Sys-
tems, in THE ECONOMICS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY 30 (L. Brookes & H. Motamen eds. 1984)
[hereinafter BROOKES & MOTAMEN] (economies of scale in electric industry).
27. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY STUDY GROUP, NUCLEAR POWER Is-
SUES AND CHOICES 109-22 (1977).
28. Drobak, From Turnpike to Nuclear Power: The Constitutional Limits On Utility
Rate Regulation 65, 65-67 B.U.L. REv. 65 (1985); C. PHILLIPS, supra note 25, at ch. 1.
29. 1 A. KAHN, supra note 21, at 14-15.
30. See Schurr, Energy, Economic Growth and Human Welfare, in BROOKES & MOTAMEN,
supra note 26, at 362 (Increasing energy production increases GNP and arguably raises
human welfare.). Contra A. LOVINS, SOFT ENERGY PATHS: TOWARDS A DURABLE PEACE 7-11
(1977) (arguing that no necessary direct ratio exists between energy growth and growth in
GNP).
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formed well into the mid-1960s as electricity costs declined. 1
These supply characteristics, together with multiple oil price es-
calations in the 1970s and the country's desire for energy indepen-
dence, made nuclear power attractive into the middle of the last
decade.
The market for electricity also has peculiar demand characteris-
tics that once favored nuclear-generated electricity. Some customer
classes find substituting other resources as the price of electricity
increases difficult. Because these consumers pay more for less or
the same amount of product, electric prices are relatively inelas-
tic.3 2 For example, when the price of electricity increases 100%,
and the demand declines only ten percent, the relationship is in-
elastic. The general wisdom is that the price elasticity of demand
for electricity is relatively inelastic with some signs of improving
long-run elasticity. 3 As utility prices rise, consumers will slowly
put their money to other uses. Consumers will use less electricity,
satisfy their electricity needs from other sources by investing in
more energy-efficient appliances, acquire electricity from alterna-
tive producers, or invest in conservation devices such as
insulation. 4
Price inelasticity has serious distributional consequences. First,
if the demand for electricity is inelastic, then, as prices increase, a
greater transfer of wealth from consumers to producers results be-
cause some consumers have greater difficulty changing to alterna-
tive sources of electricity than others. Second, as prices rise, con-
sumers who can move off-line will do so, leaving more costs to be
31. See generally L. HYMAN, supra note 23, at 89-116 (discussing the history of public
utilities from 1945-1965).
32. K. HOWE & E. RASMUSSEN, supra note 21, at 20 ("Empirical studies indicate that price
elasticity of demand for utility services is relatively inelastic.").
33. P. JosKow & R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at 156 ("Numerous studies of the de-
mand for electricity indicate that the short-run elasticity of demand at current [1983] prices
is much less than 1 and that long-run price elasticity is around 1.").
34. Conservation, whether defined as a reduction in demand or an increase in energy effi-
ciency, can be treated as a resource. See D. ROE, DYNAMOS AND VIRGINS (1984) (concerning
the Environmental Defense Fund's litigation to force utilities, specifically Pacific Gas &
Electric, to invest in conservation measures). For discussions on conservation, see Crandell,
Elgas, & Kushler, Making Residential Conservation Service Work: A Trilogy of Perspec-
tives, PuB. UTiL. FORT., Jan 10. 1985, at 28; Norland & Wolf, Utility Conservation Programs:
A Regulatory and Design Framework, PUB. UTIL. FORT. July 25, 1985, at 15.
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spread among fewer remaining captive customers. Managing cross-
subsidization and distribution issues also justifies regulation.
Because consumers demand that electricity be readily available,
and because electricity is virtually unstorable, generating capacity
must meet demand. Utilities build two types of generating facili-
ties: base load and peak load plants. Base load plants, which in-
clude all nuclear plants, run continuously. Peak load plants serve
when demand surges, such as on the hottest day of the year. In
order to meet their service obligation, utilities must be prepared to
satisfy peak demand. Electricity supply and consumption forecast-
ing worked together so well into the 1970s that peak demands were
almost always satisfied and the concept of "excess capacity" was
rarely mentioned. Today, however, that concept and its cause must
be understood. Utilities have available for their customers a "re-
serve margin" of electricity, an amount of electricity roughly
twenty percent above estimated peak. "Excess capacity" is defined
as the amount of capacity above the "reserve margin. '35 Total ca-
pacity has been calculated as high as fifty-seven percent over
peak36 and now runs at about thirty-four percent,37 which means
excess capacities of thirty-seven percent and fourteen percent
respectively.
Steadily increasing demand, coupled with the industry's econo-
mies of scale and a regulatory system that promotes capital expan-
sion, produced a sufficient number of electrical plants. Unfortu-
nately, when costs and prices turned upward and demand declined
accordingly, the country found itself with too many plants. The
rising-costs market for electricity occurred at the worst possible
time for nuclear power. Because of lead times of about ten to
twelve years,38 nuclear investments made at the tail end of the de-
clining-costs market and in the beginning of the rising-costs mar-
35. See A. KAUFMAN, K. KELLY, R. HEMPHILL, THE NATIONAL REGULATORY RESEARCH INSTI-
TUTE, COMMISSION TREATMENT OF OVERCAPACITY IN THE ELEcTRIc POWER INDUSTRY (1984);
PRINCIPLES FOR ELECTRIC POWER POLICY, supra note 12, at 124; Colton, Excess Capacity: A
Case Study in Ratemaking Theory and Application, 20 TULSA L.J. 402 (1985); Colton, Ex-
cess Capacity: Who Gets the Charge from the Power Plant?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1133 (1983);
Dialogue, Excess Capacity, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 721 (1984).
36. A. KAUFMAN, K. KELLY & R. HEMPHILL, supra note 35, at 7.
37. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, FINANCIAL CONDITION OF THE U.S. ELECTRIC UTILITY
INDUSTRY xiii (1986) [hereinafter CBO STUDY].
38. Id. at 10-11.
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ket in the late 1960s and early 1970s were made in unnecessary
plants.
The supply and demand characteristics discussed above describe
the traditional market for electricity. Until the mid-1960s, electric
utilities enjoyed a declining-costs market, economies of scale, tech-
nological improvements, and predictable linear growth. Govern-
ment regulation encouraged this market by creating state-pro-
tected monopolies that rewarded capital expansion."9 Electric
utilities then would invest capital, build more plants, generate
more electricity at lower unit costs, and expand national economic
productivity, which in turn stimulated utilities to invest more capi-
tal, thus starting the cycle over again. Naturally, this expansionist
scenario could not go on indefinitely. Starting in the late 1960s, the
economic structure of the utilities industry began to change. Con-
ditions no longer supported a monopoly model.40 Instead, the mar-
ket for electricity became more competitive.41
Today, as the real price of electricity rises, utilities must com-
pete against substitute suppliers. Competition in the electric in-
dustry comes in the form of conservation and alternative sources.
Large industrial consumers can satisfy demand from co-genera-
tion,42 self-generation, or bargaining for lower prices. Smaller resi-
dential and commercial users can insulate or invest in alternatives
such as solar power. Competition pressures utilities to set prices
that are market sensitive.4 The way to reconcile the existence and
39. For the ramifications of this regulation, see supra note 10 and accompanying text;
infra note 109 and accompanying text.
40. See generally Miller, Strategies for an Electric Utility Industry in Transition, PuB.
UTiL. FORT., June 13, 1985, at 27 (author's analysis of industry life cycles shows that electric
utilities have matured and their costs are increasing).
41. See Canto & Kadlec, The Shape of Energy Markets to Come, Pun. UTIL. FORT., Jan.
9, 1986, at 21, 23; Ferguson, Is Central Station Generation Becvming a White Elephant?,
PuB. UTiL. FORT. Mar. 21, 1985, at 32, 32; Phillips, The Changing Structure of the Public
Utility Sector, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 9, 1986, at 13, 16-19.
42. Zimmer & Jones, Cogeneration: Boon or Bane to Consumers?, PUB. UTIL. FORT., June
12, 1986, at 23, 23 (asserting that competition from cogeneration promotes efficiency by
eliminating the cross-subsidization effects of current electric policy and by basing electricity
prices on market value); see also Richards, Power Users Seek Relief from Nuclear Costs:
Big Customers May Switch Supplies or Generate Their Own, Wall St. J., Sept. 12, 1985, at
6, col. 1; Richards, Cogenerated Power Irritates Utilities: Growth Could Hasten Industry's
Deregulation, Wall St. J., Oct. 23, 1985, at 6, col. 1.
43. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
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history of large central power stations with emerging competition
is to abandon allegiance to the traditional model of utility regula-
tion and substitute a more competitive scheme. In this way, the
mix of suppliers will be controlled by a regulatory scheme that is
coordinated with contemporary market conditions."
C. Financial Indicators
The traditional economic assumptions protecting the monopoly
status of electric utilities, thus encouraging the large scale produc-
tion of electricity-including nuclear generated electric-
ity-recently have confronted a more competitive market. Not
only do utilities compete for customers, they must also compete for
capital investment. Once utilities were seen as safe investments
and were part of any well-managed portfolio.45 Today, investors
cannot be so sanguine about putting money in utility stocks and
bonds without differentiating between nuclear and non-nuclear
utilities.46
44. See infra text accompanying notes 104-26.
45. See, e.g., B. GRAHAM, D. DODD & S. COTTLE, SECURITY ANALYSIS: PRINCIPLES AND TECH-
NIQUE 570-84 (4th ed. 1962).
46. This Article designates 29 electric utilities as "nuclear" utilities. These utilities are so
designated because they have nuclear generation plants currently under construction; they
have recently completed construction of nuclear plants; or they have recently cancelled,
abandoned, or converted construction of nuclear plants. The utilities included in the sample
are:
Arizona Public Service (AZP Group)
Central Hudson Gas and Electric
Central Maine
Cincinnati Gas and Electric
Cleveland Electric
Columbus and Southern Ohio Electric
Commonwealth Edison
Consumers Power
Dayton Power and Light
Detroit Edison
Duquesne Light
Georgia Power
Gulf States Utilities
Illinois Power
Kansas City Power and Light
Kansas Gas and Electric
Long Island Lighting
Middle South Utilities
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Prior to the 1970s, the financial condition of the United States
electric industry enabled utilities simultaneously to provide low-
cost electricity to consumers and to earn a fair return on invest-
ment for their stockholders. 1 The industry was able to satisfy both
consumers and stockholders by taking advantage of economies of
scale resulting from increasingly large generation plants and more
efficient methods of transmitting and distributing electricity."' Nu-
merous factors began to threaten the financial stability of the util-
ity industry in the 1970s, however. First, the declining-costs mar-
ket reversed as utility costs rose.49 Second, new technology did not
result in further cost reductions.50 Third, fuel costs rose sharply
after the Arab oil embargo and the high inflation of 1973-74.11
Fourth, growth in electricity demand, which from 1930-70 had av-
New York State Electric and Gas
Niagara Mohawk Power
Northeast Utilities
Ohio Edison
Philadelphia Electric
Public Service of Indiana
Public Service of New Hampshire
Texas Utilities
Toledo Edison
Union Electric
United Illuminating
This sample of nuclear utilities was compiled by combining those utilities listed in the CBO
STUDY, supra note 37, at 20, and Simpson & McCoy, Nuclear Utilities' Money Raising is
Disrupted by Industry Problems, Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 1984, at 33, col. 4. All other utilities
are designated as "non-nuclear" utilities.
See also ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY INVESTOR PERCEPTIONS OF
NUCLEAR POWER 71 (1984) [hereinafter EIA STUDY]. In this study, a sample of 94 electric
utilities was divided into two subsamples, nuclear and non-nuclear. The nuclear subsample
was defined as containing those utilities that were either sole or joint owners of at least one
nuclear power plant (operating or under construction). Also included in this subsample were
subsidiaries of parent companies that owned nuclear plants. Out of the 94 utilities in the
sample, 56 were designated nuclear and 38 were designated non-nuclear. This definition of
"nuclear" utilities is much broader than the one that this Article has adopted.
47. CBO STUDY, supra note 37, at 5.
48. L. HYMAN, supra note 23, at 117; see also EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, EEI TASKFORCE
ON NUCLEAR POWER, REPORT OF THE EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE ON NUCLEAR POWER 1 (1985)
[hereinafter EEl REPORT].
49. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ANALYSIS OF THE FINANCIAL HEALTH OF
THE ELECTRIC UTILrY INDUSTRY 10 (1984) [hereinafter GAO STUDY]; see also L. HYMAN,
supra note 23, at 117; EEl REPORT, supra note 48, at 2.
50. L. HYMAN, supra note 23, at 117.
51. CBO STUDY, supra note 37, at 8; GAO STUDY, supra note 49, at 11.
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eraged an annual rate of 7%, slackened to 2.5% annually for the
period of 1970-83. 2 Fifth, following TMI, regulatory requirements
increased.58 Finally, construction costs for new generating plants,
particularly for nuclear plants, rose as a result of construction de-
lays, high interest rates, new safety regulations, social and environ-
mental concerns, and demand uncertainties. 4 The entire industry
faced a period of economic turmoil marked by declining profitabil-
ity, lowered bond ratings, and falling stock prices. 5
Today, electric utilities have escaped the financial morass of the
1970s and are in better financial condition than at any time in re-
cent years,56 partially because of the kindness of regulators. Still,
the financial palpitations felt by the industry signal congenital
health problems. Nuclear utilities have faced peculiar financing
difficulties. 57 The Congressional Budget Office recently published a
study identifying fifteen of the 100 largest investor-owned electric
utilities as experiencing cash flow shortages precisely because of
their nuclear construction programs." While construction costs
have increased for all electric generation plants, they have risen
most rapidly for nuclear plants. The cost of constructing a typical
nuclear plant rose from about $715 per kilowatt in the period 1971-
74 to about $1,389 in the period 1981-84. The Congressional
Budget Office projects that the cost of a nuclear plant entering op-
eration in 1985 or 1986 has almost doubled to $2,600 per kilo-
watt.59 The financial strains of nuclear construction caused by
52. CBO STUDY, supra note 37, at 9; cf. GAO STUDY, supra note 49, at 11 (annual growth
rate for period 1970-81 was 2.1% compared with previous 25-year average of 7.2%).
53. CBO STUDY, supra note 37, at 10.
54. See CBO STUDY, supra note 37, at 8; GAO STUDY, supra note 49, at 11.
55. L. HYMAN, supra note 23, at 118.
56. CBO STUDY, supra note 37, at xi; GAO STUDY, supra note 49, at 10. Indeed, several
electric utilities have a problem with too much cash. See Hall, Cash Surplus: Strategies for
Dealing With the Problem of Plenty, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Apr. 3, 1986, at 18; Rose, Utilities
Flush With Cash Enter New Fields, Wall St. J., July 1, 1986, at 6, col. 1.
57. CBO STUDY, supra note 37, at 2.
58. Id. at 19-20 (table listing utility and name of construction project) (note that three
utilities, Consumers Power, Dayton Power and Light, and Public Service of Indiana, have
recently abandoned, deferred, or converted their projects); see also PUBLIC UTILITrES RE-
PORTS, INC., THE P.U.R. ANALYSIS OF INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC AND GAS UTILrrIES 1985 Edi-
tion passim (1985) (data on each of the 15 utilities shows that construction projects are
nuclear projects) [hereinafter P.U.R. ANALYSIS].
59. CBO STUDY, supra note 37, at 10-11. Estimating construction costs for nuclear plants
is not an exact science because of the many variables that can affect cost. Differences in
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heavy borrowing, 0 together with the structural reversal of the mar-
ket, have caused utilities to cancel nuclear projects. Between 1974
and 1984, ninety-seven nuclear plants were cancelled.6 It is esti-
mated that the costs for these cancelled plants are between $10
billion and $100 billion, thus threatening the financial health of
the industry.62
The financial heath of the electric utility industry is best mea-
sured in the capital market, which indicates a firm's ability to raise
money. A utility's ability to attract capital can be gauged through
design and location of plants, treatment of authorized funding used during construction,
construction of single versus multiple units, assignment of costs among multiple units, and
interest charges and construction delays can all lead to cost variances among plants. OFFICE
OF COAL, NUCLEAR, ELECTRIC, AND ALTERNATE FUELS, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, SURVEY OF Nu-
CLEAR PLANT CONSTRUCTION COSTS 15 (1984); see also ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., U.S.
DEP'T OF ENERGY, AN ANALYSIS OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT CONSTRUCTION COSTS ch. 3 (1986)
(additional factors affecting construction costs are size of unit, whether plant uses cooling
towers, start date of construction, experience of contractor, and whether utility is construc-
tion manager). Because of these factors, estimates of nuclear construction costs vary widely.
See, e.g., id. at ix (inflation-adjusted cost for plants that entered construction in 1966-67
was $700 per kilowatt compared with $3,100 per kilowatt for plants that entered construc-
tion in 1974-75); OFFICE OF COAL, NUCLEAR, ELECTRIC, AND ALTERNATE FUELS, supra, at 15
(average cost per kilowatt of capacity increased from $313 in period 1971-74 to $1,229 in
period 1981-84); C. Komanoff, Assessing the High Costs of New U.S. Nuclear Power Plants
(June 1984) (copy on file with authors) (average construction cost per kilowatt in 1982 dol-
lars was $2,100 (excluding AFUDC) for nuclear plants, compared to $800-$900 per kilowatt
for coal plants); Perl, Estimated Costs of Coal and Nuclear Plant Generation table 2 (Dec.
12, 1978) (paper on file with authors) (average construction costs for 1200 megawatt plant in
1990 dollars is $2,195.35 per kilowatt for nuclear, compared to $1,566.12 per kilowatt for
coal); Itteilag & Pavle, Nuclear Plants' Anticipated Costs and Their Impact on Future
Electric Rates, PUB. UTm. FORT., Mar. 21, 1985, at 35, 37 (The average estimated cost per
kilowatt of installed capacity in 1984 was $2,400 compared to $135 per kilowatt in 1970 and
$630 per kilowatt in 1980.).
60. See GAO STUDY, supra note 49, at 19; see also Simpson and McCoy, Nuclear Utili-
ties' Money Raising is Disrupted by Industry Problems, Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 1984, at 33,
col. 4.
61. CBO STUDY, supra note 37, at 11.
62. The Department of Energy estimates abandonment costs at $8.1 billion in its worse-
case study. NUCLEAR PLANT CANCELLATIONS, supra note 14, at xxi, table ES4. The estimate is
low even in a worst case because plants costing more than $8.1 billion were cancelled after
the report. Economist Charles Komanoff estimates that the national economic damage
caused by nuclear abandonment is $65 billion to $100 billion. The figure includes $15 billion
invested in cancelled plants, $20 billion to $40 billion invested in plants likely to be can-
celled, and $30 billion to $40 billion attributable to plants with large cost overruns. C.
Komanoff, supra note 59; see also C. FLAVIN, NUCLEAR POWER: THE MARKET TEST 33-42
(1983); Hertsgaard, Nuclear Power: Too Costly to Save, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1984, at F3,
col. 1.
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an examination of financial indicators. Although the industry, fi-
nancial institutions, and public commissions63 use several financial
indicators, this Article discusses three common ones: rate of return
on common equity; ratio of market price to book value of common
stock; and corporate bond ratings."'
The rate of return on common equity measures the return of
common stockholders. A firm pays stockholders through retained
earnings.65 The rate of return on common equity provides a mea-
sure of how well a utility has done with its stockholders' invest-
ment dollars.68 Firms, however, pay return on equity only after
other debt obligations, including bond obligations, have been paid.
If revenues are insufficient to cover debt interest, firms can reduce
or eliminate dividends. Several nuclear utilities have done so. Long
Island Lighting Company, for example, has omitted a quarterly
dividend on its common stock since March 1984.7
The return on equity received by stockholders should be com-
mensurate with the risk of their investment. A stockholder will be
satisfied with a lower return for a lower risk; conversely, a stock-
holder will demand a higher return for a riskier investment.6 8 The
Energy Information Administration of the Department of Energy
has found that stockholders have perceived investment in nuclear
utilities to be riskier than investment in non-nuclear utilities. Con-
63. GAO STUDY, supra note 49, at ii.
64. Id. The GAO Study also lists 14 other financial indicators: interest coverage; debt to
equity; internal generation of funds; load factor; dividend as a percentage of book value;
return on net plant; allowance for funds used as a percentage of income; effective tax rate;
price earnings ratio; capital expenditures as a percentage of total capital; construction work-
in-progress as a percentage of net plant in service; capital employed per kilowatt hour; pro-
duction cost per kilowatt hour; and dividend payout. Id. at 32.
65. See CBO STUDY, supra note 37, at 25.
66. GAO STUDY, supra note 49, at 7.
67. See CBO STUDY, supra note 37, at 25-26. Other dividend omissions and reductions
include:
Central Maine omitted since 4/85
Consumers Power omitted since 10/84
General Public Utilities omitted since 11/26/79
Middle South Utilities omitted since 3d quarter 1985
Public Service of New Hampshire omitted since 4/19/84
Public Service of Indiana reduced 65% since 2/84
United Illuminating reduced 38% since 7/84
Id. at 26, table 4.
68. See L. HYMAN, supra note 23, at 257.
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sequently, the return on the average nuclear utility rose one to two
percentage points higher than the return on the average non-nu-
clear stock. 9 This differential is the risk premium necessary to in-
duce stockholders to invest in nuclear power. Consistent with these
findings, the industry as a whole averaged a return on equity of
12.49% during 1980-82, 7 while a number of nuclear utilities aver-
aged returns of above 13.5% for this same period.7 '
The market-price-to-book-value ratio of a firm compares the
market price of its common stock with the stock's book value.
Book value is common equity divided by the number of shares of
common stock outstanding. 2 This ratio is helpful in assessing the
financial community's perception of the strength of a utility's fu-
ture rate of return. If return on common equity is expected to be
comparable to the returns available on alternative investments, the
market price of the utility's common stock will be close to its book
value. This results in a market-price-to-book-value ratio of approx-
imately one. If the financial community expects the utility's future
rate of return to be less strong than that of alternative invest-
ments, however, the market price of its common stock will be be-
low its book value, resulting in a market-to-book ratio below one.7 3
69. EIA STUDY, supra note 46, at x-xi.
70. Figures for return on common equity were compiled and averaged from the Annual
Reports on American Industry, Electric Utilities, FORBES, Jan. 5, 1981, at 217; Annual Re-
ports on American Industry, Electric Utilities, FORBES, Jan. 4, 1982, at 104; Annual Report
on American Industry, Electric Utilities, FORBES, Jan. 3, 1983, at 103.
71. For example:
Texas Utilities 15.7%
Public Service of Indiana 15.23%
Arizona Public Service (AZP Group) 14%
New York State Electric and Gas 13.87%
Gulf State Utilities 13.63%
Illinois Power 13.57%
Long Island Lighting 13.57%
Figures compiled and averaged from Annual Reports on American Industry, Electric Utili-
ties, FORBES, Jan. 5, 1981, at 217; Annual Reports on American Industry, Electric Utilities,
FORBES, Jan. 4, 1982, at 104; Annual Reports on American Industry, Electric Utilities,
FORBES, Jan. 3, 1983, at 103. While these utilities have shown high rates of return, some
non-nuclear utilities have experienced high returns also (e.g., the average return on equity
for Southwestern Public Service for 1980-82 was 18.03%). Id.
72. GAO STUDY, supra note 49, at 71; see also B. GRAHAM, P. DODD, S. COTTLE, supra note
45, at 596-99.
73. GAO STUDY, supra note 49, at 7-8.
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The condition resulting from a market-to-book ratio below one is
known as stock dilution.74
Reflecting the poor financial condition of the utility industry in
the 1970s, the market-price-to-book-value ratios of both nuclear
and non-nuclear utilities indicated stock dilution.75 Electric utility
stocks closed at prices below book value in each of the years 1973-
80.76 Nuclear utility stocks have experienced a more prolonged pe-
riod of dilution than have non-nuclear utility stocks, however. For
example, during the post-TMI years 1979-81, nuclear utilities
showed an average market-to-book ratio of .736, while that of non-
nuclear utilities was a close .737. During the years 1982-84, how-
ever, the market-price-to-book-value of non-nuclear utility stocks
rose to an average of .956. During this same period, the market-to-
book ratio of nuclear utility stocks also rose, but only to an average
of .812.71 From 1975 through 1984, only six nuclear utilities out of
a sample of twenty-five showed a market-to-book ratio of above
one in at least one of the ten years; in contrast, twenty-five of
forty-two non-nuclear utilities showed a ratio of above one in at
least one of those years.78 In the last five years, the market-price-
to-book-value ratio for most utilities has improved with the elec-
tric industry in general; the average market-to-book ratio for the
industry rose to 1.1 in June 1985.71 The market-to-book ratios for
nuclear utilities continue to indicate stock dilution, however. s0
74. Cf. L. HYMAN, supra note 23, at 5, 251 (discussing the diluting effect of a low market-
to-book ratio on stock).
75. Id. at 107.
76. Id. at 262.
77. Figures compiled from MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, MOODY'S HANDBOOK OF COMMON
STOCKS (Spring ed. 1986). Market-price-to-book-value ratios for individual electric utilities
were calculated by dividing both the high and low market price of stock for each year by the
year's book value. This Article designates the average of the resulting high and low market-
to-book ratio for each year as the market-price-to-book-value ratio. The ratios for the nu-
clear utilities were derived from the average ratios for 25 utilities; the ratios for the non-
nuclear utilities were derived from the average ratios for 42 utilities.
78. Data compiled from MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, MOODY'S HANDBOOK OF COMMON
STOCKS (Spring ed. 1986 & Spring ed. 1982). Each of the six nuclear utilities that exper-
ienced a market-to-book ratio of more than one did so between 1975 and 1977; from 1977
through 1984, none of the sample of nuclear utilities showed a ratio of more than one. Id.
79. CBO STUDY, supra note 37, at 18.
80. In 1984, the most recent year for which data was available, the average market-price-
to-book-value ratio for the sample of 25 nuclear utilities was .735; by comparison, that of the
sample of 42 non-nuclear utilities was 1.003. See also CBO STUDY supra note 37, at 19.
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Corporate bond ratings focus on the creditworthiness of a firm,
indicating the firm's ability to attract debt-financed capital and its
ability to repay creditors. This rating provides a way of measuring
a lender's perception of a firm's long-term financial prospects."' In-
dependent rating agencies issue bond ratings.8 2 The two largest
agencies, Moody's and Standard and Poor's, rate a firm's bond is-
sues according to letter guides. Ratings of Aaa, from Moody's, or
AAA, from Standard and Poor's, are the highest, indicating the
best quality bonds with extremely strong ability to repay debt.
From these highs, ratings decline to Aa, A, Baa, Ba, and B from
Moody's and AA, A, BBB, BB, and B from Standard and Poor's.
Generally, the financial market considers bonds rated below Baa or
BBB not of investment quality. 3
Nuclear utility bond ratings are lower than those of non-nuclear
utilities. In 1970, ninety-six percent of the utilities with nuclear
construction that were rated by Standard and Poor's received a
bond rating of A or above.84 Such high ratings indicated that the
long-term financial health of nuclear utilities was expected to be
strong, meaning that debt readily could be repaid. Over the next
decade, however, the financial health of nuclear utilities deterio-
rated. By 1980, only sixty-seven percent of utilities with nuclear
construction had even investment-grade ratings.8 5 Indeed, by the
early 1980s, the ratings of some utilities had fallen so low that laws
prohibited many institutional investors from buying their bonds
due to their speculative nature.8 ' By contrast, bond ratings for util-
ities without nuclear construction generally remained good during
the 1970s and into the 1980s. The mean bond rating for non-nu-
clear utilities remained within the Aa to A range, while, by 1983,
the mean bond rating for nuclear utilities had fallen to BBB.8 , Us-
ing Moody's ratings for the period 1983-85, non-nuclear and nu-
81. GAO STUDY, supra note 49, at 8-9.
82. See id. at 8.
83. L. HYMAN, supra note 23, at 254-55.
84. CBO STUDY, supra note 37, at 15; see also GAO STUDY, supra note 49, at 10.
85. CBO STUDY, supra note 37, at 15.
86. Id.; see also L. HYMAN, supra note 23, at 255.
87. CBO STUDY, supra note 37, at 15.
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clear utility bonds maintained comparable average ratings of Aa to
A and Baa, respectively.88
Because a utility's bond rating reflects its ability to attract debt-
financed capital and its ability to repay creditors, the depressed
bond ratings of nuclear utilities indicate that they have trouble at-
tracting new debt capital. Low. bond ratings therefore reflect the
difficulties that nuclear utilities have in resolving their cash-flow
problems and gaining a stronger financial position.
Many nuclear utilities now carry larger debts than ever before,
debts greatly in excess of the types of debt carried by non-nuclear
firms.8 9 To the extent that a jurisdiction forbids "construction
work in progress" to be included in the rate base, thus preventing
costs from being passed through to consumers, a utility cannot
earn a return on plant that has not been placed into service. Be-
cause of construction delays and lengthy lead times,90 nuclear utili-
ties suffer when they cannot earn a return on nonproductive assets.
The costs of nuclear construction are such that they absorb a ma-
jor portion of a firm's assets. Philadelphia Electric Company, for
example, has assets of $8.1 billion, is capitalized at $7.57 billion,
and has $3.4 billion tied up with the construction of Limerick
88. Ratings compiled from MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, MOODY'S PUBLIC UTILITY MANUAL
(vols. 1983, 1984 & 1985). This Article derived the average bond rating for a sample of 25
nuclear utilities and 43 non-nuclear utilities by assigning each rating from Aaa to B a nu-
merical value:
Aaa = 6
Aa = 5
A=4
Baa = 3
Ba = 2
B=1
The average numerical value for the nuclear sample was 2.99, indicating a bond rating of
Baa. The average numerical value for the non-nuclear sample was 4.57, indicating a bond
rating between A and Aa. Since May 3, 1982, Moody's has used numerical modifiers to indi-
cate gradation within a rating (e.g., Baa2). These numerical modifiers were not figured into
the averages.
89. In 1984, the average ratio of debt (preferred stock and long-term debt) to assets (net
utility plant) for the sample of 29 nuclear utilities was 59.7%, while the average ratio of
debt to assets for the sample of 42 non-nuclear utilities was 51.9%. Figures compiled from
P.U.R. ANALYSIS, supra note 58. The ratio of debt to equity for individual utilities was calcu-
lated by adding the dollar amounts of preferred stock and long-term debt and dividing the
total by net utility plant. These results were then averaged to arrive at the average ratio of
debt to assets for each sample.
90. CBO STUDY, supra note 37, at 10-11.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Units 1 and 2. 91 Carrying large amounts of debt for long periods of
time means that interest charges can approach principal 2 and can
cost millions of dollars per month,93 thus putting a further finan-
cial strain on utilities.
Utility financing also experienced the unevenness of the transi-
tion. Market changes and changes in utilities' financial require-
ments increased their financial risk. Traditionally, the capital
structure of utilities was highly leveraged: utilities were financed
with more debt than equity. 4 Almost two-thirds of the money
raised by utilities comes from bonds and preferred stock.9 5 High
leveraging makes sense with the traditional market structure over
a substantial range of investment. Utilities preferred debt financ-
ing because they could borrow large sums and keep the firm's over-
all rate of return fairly low because bonds are a less risky invest-
ment than common stock. High leveraging also increases the
attractiveness of common stock. Because a smaller percentage of
common stock is issued, its return is raised. 6
Leveraging works less well in today's climate of increasing costs.
High leveraging means larger fixed costs and lower interest cover-
age, thus increasing the risk of bankruptcy. If a utility becomes too
heavily leveraged, it will not earn enough revenue to pay its debt.
The utility must then try to raise money through equity financing.
In order to restructure financing from debt to equity during a deli-
cate financial period, the return on equity must be raised to attract
capital, again raising the cost of money. When internal sources of
capital are exhausted and debt charges absorb income, however,
the value of new common stock is diluted,97 thus increasing finan-
cial risk.
91. P.U.R. ANALYSIS, supra note 58, at 294-95.
92. EEI REPORT, supra note 48, at 34 (60% of principle with 13-year lead-time for
construction).
93. For example, because of construction delays, the interest costs for Public Service
Company of Indiana's Marble Hill Unit 1 increased by $45 million per month prior to its
cancellation. ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INC., REPORT TO GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON PUBLIC SERVICE
COMPANY OF INDIANA 7 (Dec. 21, 1983), reprinted in GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE REPORT ON
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF INDIANA MARBLE HILL STATION (1984).
94. See generally K. HowE & E. RASMUSSEN, supra note 21, at 255-62.
95. L. HYMAN, supra note 23, at 201.
96. K. HowE & E. RASMUSSEN, supra note 21, at 260-61.
97. L. HYMAN, supra note 23, at 251.
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These financial indicators all point in one direction. The cost of
obtaining money for nuclear utilities during the transition was
higher than the cost of obtaining money for non-nuclear utilities.
Utilities can attempt to satisfy their demand for capital internally
through depreciation, deferred taxes or retained earnings, or exter-
nally through borrowing or through issuing stock or bonds, but
none of these avenues afford complete relief. 8 In addition, utilities
can seek regulatory relief from their financial troubles.99
The need for nuclear financing caused a cash flow squeeze on
utilities. The pressure for cash forced utilities to engage in creative
accounting techniques through devices such as accelerated depreci-
ation, normalization of taxes, and including "construction work in
progress" in the rate base, all of which required regulatory ap-
proval. Accelerating the amount of depreciation a utility can take
in a given year means that more money is available earlier for the
utility.100 Likewise, tax normalization adds to cash flow by treating
accelerated depreciation as a deferment of taxes.101 Finally, "con-
struction work in progress" is an accounting entry which includes
in the rate base money invested in an ongoing construction project,
thus allowing a rate of return on money invested in construction
even though no electricity is produced. 102 The express intent of
each of these methods is to improve the cash flow position of
utilities.
During the 1970s, electric, especially nuclear, utilities suffered
declining earnings, lower bond ratings, stock dilution, and an in-
crease in the ratio of non-productive to productive assets, thus
triggering the need for cash flow accounting. In the 1980s, these
trends began to reverse as plants were completed or taken off line
and, more significantly, as managers and regulators responded to
the cash flow needs of utilities. The transition period has made its
98. CB0 STUDY, supra note 37, at 23-42.
99. Id. at 26-30. Regulatory relief is a costly alternative because of its uncertainty. Some
analysts argue that regulatory hostility has forced utility managers to reduce or eliminate
capital spending. See, e.g., P. NAVARRO, THE DIMMING OF AMERICA. TiE REAL COSTS OF ELEC-
TRIc UTImTv FAILURE 13-25 (1985). The reduction in prudent capital investment means that
investors will look elsewhere for investment opportunities, thus reducing the capital availa-
ble to utilities.
100. K. HOWE & E. RASMUSSEN, supra note 21, at 84-86.
101. Id. at 86-88.
102. Id. at 92.
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presence known, however, by altering the way capital markets and
utility managers assess the financial structure of utilities. For the
foreseeable future, managers must accept the reality of greater fi-
nancial risk.10 3 Likewise, regulators must reassess the role of finan-
cial risk in the rate-making process. Transition in both the market
for electricity and in the financing schemes of utilities signals
change in the regulatory sector as well.
D. Nuclear Rate Making
Both government regulation and market competition, the public
and private sides of utilities, find common ground in the rate-mak-
ing process. Rate making is the central connection between the
state and a utility's financial health. If the rate-making process is
sound, the financial health of utilities will be sound as well. This
soundness claim does not mean, however, that regulators must
grant rate increases geared to the satisfaction of utilities.104 Rather,
sound rate making is based on efficient market mimicking and eq-
uitable political judgments.1 0 5 Unfortunately, economic, political,
and regulatory coordination is not currently the case. The contem-
porary regulatory scheme is based on nineteenth century market
assumptions.'0 6 Unless the rate-making process is modified dra-
matically, electric utilities will continue to be subject to an anach-
ronistic scheme of regulation.
The traditional political response to the problems of natural mo-
nopolies-lower output, higher prices, lost consumer surplus, and
economic waste-was government regulation. The delicate problem
was one of design: How can government regulation appear attrac-
103. Although financial risk increases with increasing competition, investor-owned utility
bankruptcy is unlikely because it is inherently inefficient. See Flaschen & Reilly, Bank-
ruptcy Analysis of a Financially-Troubled Electric Utility, 22 Hous. L. REv. 965 (1985).
Public utilities commissions also have rejected bankruptcy as a viable alternative. See, e.g.,
Consumers Power Co., 66 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 1 (Mich. PSC 1985); Public Serv. Co.
of New Hampshire, 66 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 349 (N.H. PUC 1985).
104. Regulated firms have no constitutional right to financial integrity. See Market St.
Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 324 U.S. 548, 566-69 (1945); Pennsylvania Elec. Co. v. Pennsylva-
nia Pub. Util. Comm'n, 502 A.2d 130 (Pa. 1985), appeal dismissed sub nom. Metropolitan
Edison Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 106 S. Ct. 2239 (1986).
105. See, e.g., 1 A. KAHN, supra note 21, at 1-19.
106. Allison, Imprudent Power Construction Projects: The Malaise of Traditional Public
Utility Policies, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv. 507 (1985).
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tive enough to encourage the private sector to invest money in a
regulated industry? The answer was to design a regulatory scheme
that gave a utility some of the economic benefits of a monopoly
without imposing a monopoly's costs on society.
Governments based public utility regulation on a fundamental
tradeoff. In exchange for exclusive jurisdiction over a specific geo-
graphic service area, a regulated utility had to do two things. First,
the utility undertook a service obligation preventing the utility
from moving its resources into more financially attractive invest-
ment opportunities whenever they came along. Instead, utilities
had to invest in satisfaction of the service obligation. 10 7 The prob-
lem was that nothing prevented the utility from shutting down ser-
vice and going out of business. Surely a "service obligation" cannot
force someone to work without a financial incentive. This need for
financial support implicates the second, and more important, obli-
gation assumed by a utility: allowing the state to set its prices
through rate making. 108 Admittedly, the idea of rate making by
government rather than by market appears to be a disincentive.
When examined closely, however, the rate-making formula clearly
serves a special function. It encourages capital expansion by re-
warding capital spending. When the market for electricity changed,
this formula had the anomalous effect of aggravating a weakening
financial situation, particularly for long lead-time nuclear
projects.109 Utilities had to borrow increasing amounts of money at
107. See, e.g., 1 A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 227-83 (1969).
108. C. PHILLIPS, supra note 25, at ch. 5.
109. See generally E. GELLHORN & R. PIERCE, REGULATED INDUSTRIES 88-92 (1987); C.
PHILLIPS, supra note 25, at 156-61; J. TOMAIN, ENERGY LAW 104-35 (1981).
The classic rate-making formula can be stated as R = 0 + r, where:
R = revenue requirement
0 = operating expenses
B = rate base
r = rate of return
The revenue requirement (R) is the total amount of money a utility is entitled to earn by
law. In other words, R is the amount of money a utility can charge its customers. In order to
make a profit, any firm must recover its costs. As a result, utilities can recover reasonably
incurred operating expenses (0). In addition to these operating expenses, which basically
cover the utility's variable costs, the utility is entitled to recover its fixed capital invest-
ments. This variable is known as the rate base (B). Not only does the utility recover its
capital investment, it also earns a return on the investment (r). These two variables (B and
r) drive the rate-making formula. They are the variables that make a regulated public utility
most like a nonregulated competitive firm. A utility manager can earn a profit for the firm
1987]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
increasingly higher interest rates, thus raising the price of electric-
ity and decreasing demand. As demand decreased, prices rose even
further for more captive customers, thus decreasing demand even
further. As rates increase, consumers use less electricity, necessi-
tating higher prices and putting utilities into a financial "death
spiral."110 Simply put, the reward system, which works in a declin-
ing-costs, expanding-demand market, does not work for the nu-
clear market.
Traditional rate making has induced utilities to over-invest in
what has turned out to be unnecessary and expensive nuclear
plants. Nuclear utilities have made three sorts of mistaken invest-
ment. First, planners grossly underestimated construction costs,
thus putting utilities into a cash squeeze."" Second, plants under
construction were cancelled.1 2 Third, completed plants contrib-
uted to excess capacity."' These mistaken investment decisions
left billions of dollars in costs to be allocated. In response to the
industry's financial predicament, regulators were asked to accom-
modate utilities with financial support.
The request for financial aid, or regulatory relief, was unprece-
dented because of both its magnitude and its peculiar circum-
stances. The size of requested rate increases either threatened to
by realizing efficiency in production. Moreover, capital investment is encouraged because
the return on investment increases with the amount invested. The tendency of the rate
formula to encourge over-investment is the Averch-Johnson (A-J) effect. See Averch &
Johnson, supra note 10, at 1065. The A-J effect appears to occur in the kind of declining-
costs market described earlier. It most likely will not occur, or will be reversed, in a rising-
costs market with the traditional formula. See P. NAVARRO, supra note 99, at 15-16.
110. Thompson, New Driving Forces in the Electric Energy Marketplace-To a "Death
Spiral" or Vigorous Competition?, PuB. UT. FORT., June 21, 1984, at 31, 37-38.
111. Examples of three plants should suffice to demonstrate gross underestimation.
Cost Estimates Zimmer Marble Hill Shoreham
Original Cost $240 million $1.4 billion $265 million
Cost to Complete $3.1 billion $7 billion $5 billion
J. TOMAIN, NUCLEAR POWER TRANSFORMATION 185 (1987); see also NUCLEAR PLANT CANCEL-
LATIONS, supra note 14, at 17-24. When utility managers make imprudent investment deci-
sions, the amount found to be spent imprudently is disallowed rate base treatment and
shareholders, not ratepayers, absorb the loss. See, e.g., Long Island Lighting Company -
Phase II - Proceeding on Motion of Commission to Investigate Cost of Construction of
Shoreham Nuclear Generating Facility, [State Current Decisions] Util. L. Rep. (CCH)
24,922 (N.Y. PSC Dec. 16, 1985).
112. See supra notes 14 and 62 and accompanying text.
113. CBO STUDY, supra note 37, at 1-4.
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bankrupt utilities if denied, or to paralyze consumers by rate shock
if granted." 4 Furthermore, the utilities' request for regulatory re-
lief lacked a readily identifiable quid pro quo. With excess capacity
additions and cancelled plants, ratepayers were asked to pay with-
out receiving any electricity for their payments. In the case of im-
prudent investment, ratepayers were asked to subsidize utility
managers' mistakes. The regulatory dilemma was between threat-
ening the financial integrity of utilities or abandoning cost-of-ser-
vice rate making. Not surprisingly, regulators "balanced" share-
holder and ratepayer interests. Regulators based this balancing on
political expediency, not economic theory, as detailed in Part HI of
this Article.
Basically, utilities ask for two types of regulatory relief: first,
that plant cancellation costs and excess capacity addition costs be
included in the rate base under the theory that the construction
decisions were prudent when made;"-5 and second, that their cash
flow be improved primarily through inclusion of "construction
work in progress" in the rate base, but also through helpful ac-
counting practices such as tax normalization and accelerated de-
preciation. Consumers have two counterarguments. First, under
the "used and useful" theory," 6 they should not pay for what they
do not receive. Second, they should not pay for imprudent
investment.
The consumers' side is problematic. If utilities are forced to ab-
sorb all losses, the utilities will be threatened with bankruptcy, and
bankruptcy will raise the cost of electricity. 17 Furthermore, the in-
centive structure under the used and useful standard encourages
utilities to continue to dump money into nuclear projects or into
coal conversion in order to bring them on-line, and this threatens
114. See CBO STUDY, supra note 37, at xiii.
115. Gary & Roach, The Proper Regulatory Treatment of Investment in Cancelled Util-
ity Plants, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv. 469 (1985); see also Dakin, The Changing Nature of Public
Utility Regulation: The Used and Useful Property Rate Base Versus the Capitalization
Rate Base in the Nuclear Age, 45 LA. L. REv. 1033 (1985).
116. Colton, Excess Capacity: Who Gets the Charge from the Power Plant?, supra note
35, at 1137-41.
117. Maine Pub. Serv. Co., 67 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 101, 119-20 (Me. PUC 1985);
Consumers Power Co., 66 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 1, 20-21 (Mich. PSC 1985); Public
Serv. Co., 66 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 349, 424-28 (N.H. PUC 1985).
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rate shock.11 Finally, if all construction work in progress is ex-
cluded from the rate base, when the plant is put on-line rates will
be relatively higher to account for additional carrying costs.119
In light of the changes in the underlying premises for the tradi-
tional rate-making equation, such as changes in electricity demand
and supply characteristics and in utility financing, the old regime
is confronting a new world. Many people are questioning the tradi-
tional rate formula. Such questioning is endemic to a transitional
period. Rate making based on a monopoly model simply does not
work in a competitive environment. As the market becomes more
competitive, rate making must, for efficiency and equity reasons,
reflect the economic-market-value of a kilowatt, rather than a
utility's internal historic costs. 120 By setting rates on a utility's
avoided costs, the cost the utility would pay to purchase a unit of
electricity in the market, society realizes both efficiency and equity
in electricity pricing. First, the utility bears business and financial
risks under this approach. If a new project costs more than the
economic value of electricity, then shareholders must suffer. The
avoided cost method thus gives utilities an incentive to produce
electricity at or below market value, thereby rewarding their share-
holders for efficiency gains. Second, the method avoids intergener-
ational equity problems by setting the price at current economic
value. Third, market-based pricing eliminates unfair distributional
issues such as cross-subsidization. Finally, a rate-making formula
based on avoided costs privatizes risks and gains without social-
118. See Olson, Statutes Prohibiting Cost Recovery for Cancelled Nuclear Power Plants:
Constitutional? Pro-Consumer?, 28 J. URB. & CoNTEmp. L. 345 (1985).
119. See Morin, An Empirical Study of the Effect of CWIP on Cost of Capital and Reve-
nue Requirements, PUB. UT. FORT., July 10, 1986, at 21 (Part I), and July 24, 1986, at 24
(Part II).
120. See, e.g., Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Facility, Docket Nos. 120,924-U and
142,098-U (KG&E); 142,098-U (KCP&L); 142,099-U (KEPC) (Sept. 27, 1985); Kolbe, How
Can Regulated Rates and Companies Survive Competition?, PUS. UTIL. FORT., Apr. 4, 1985,
at 25; Kubitz, The Energy Utilities: How to Increase Rewards to Match Increasing Risks,
in PROFIT AND THE PURSUIT OF ENERGY: MARKETS AND REGULATION (Aronson & Cowhey eds.
1983); Gottstein, Avoided Costs Ratemaking for Diablo Canyon, Application No. 84-06-014
(Sept. 10, 1985) (copy on file with authors); Prepared Testimony of Ron Knecht, California
Public Utilities Commission, Order Instituting Investigation No. 85-05-001 Southern Cali-
fornia Edison Company Respondent, Ratemaking for the Palo Verde Nuclear Project (June
17, 1985) (copy on file with authors).
[Vol. 28:363
1987] NUCLEAR TRANSITION
izing any single utility's internal inefficiencies, such as mistaken or
imprudent investment.' 2 '
During transition from traditional regulation to competition,
that is, from monopoly status to competitive status, regulators will
not step aside completely and let the market set prices for electric-
ity. 22 Nevertheless, the threat and promise of greater competition
affects the regulation of the industry. Public utility commissions
are beginning to experiment with rate formulas by incorporating
the incentives of a competitive market. Regulators are developing
rate formulas that promote energy or economic efficiency.' 23 They
also are utilizing performance standards to encourage firms to
spend money prudently instead of reflexively investing in capital
expansion. 24 The object of these experiments is to align contempo-
rary regulation with the contemporary market.
E. The New Market for Nuclear Power
The economic, financial, and regulatory status of electric utilities
is in a period of profound fluctuation. Because the structure of the
market has changed, both the way the utilities structure them-
121. Distribution and subsidization (or redistribution and cross-subsidization) are politi-
cal justifications for regulation. Any change in legal rules has distributional consequences.
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & EcON. 1 (1960). Currently, one could argue
that large industrial users subsidize smaller residential users. See L. HYMAN, supra note 23,
at 185. Market based prices, then, have the potential of raising costs to residential consum-
ers. If electricity rates do not reflect market value, however, then larger users move off line,
further increasing costs to residential consumers.
122. See P. JOSKOW & R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 13, at ch. 14; Collins, supra note 21, at
184-91; Varley, Is the Electric Utility Industry Ready for Deregulation?, PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
Sept. 19, 1985, at 17. L. Hyman, The Future of the Electric Utility Industry (June 24, 1985)
(paper on file with authors).
Although competition is clearly increasing, total deregulation in the near term is unlikely
because some segments of the electricity fuel cycle are less competitive than others. A con-
sideration of the separate elements of the fuel cycle-generation, transmission, and distribu-
tion-demonstrates that the market for generation is more competitive than the markets for
transmission or distribution. Furthermore, some classes (large industrial users) have more
flexibility than other classes (residential users). Deregulation is further complicated by the
fact that most electric utilities integrate those functions.
123. See FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, FINAL REPOR. INCENTIVE REGULA-
TION IN THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY (1983); Costello, Fup, & Monson, Incentive and
Economic Development Rates as a Marketing Strategy for Electric Utilities, PUB. UTM.
FORT., May 15, 1986, at 27.
124. See Smith & Dickter, Living With Standards of Performance Programs, PUB. UTM.
FORT., Aug. 16, 1984, at 26.
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selves financially and the way public utility commissions set rates
are being altered. Competition challenges the natural monopoly
concept, thus forcing policy makers to question the historic eco-
nomic model of utility regulation. Next, highly leveraged financing
has put nuclear utilities in a severe credit crunch, forcing them to
engage in short-term accounting techniques expressly for the pur-
pose of stimulating cash flow through regulatory relief. Finally, the
rate-making process reflects the impact of changes in economics
and finances. Utilities are being forced to compete and will not en-
joy the regulatory subsidies they once did. Conservation and en-
ergy efficiency 125 are becoming increasingly attractive to users.
Electric, particularly nuclear, utilities must realize that the tradi-
tional capital expansion view of the world can no longer be taken
for granted. Instead, utilities are losing their preeminent position
as suppliers of electricity. Utilities must respond to the changing
supply and demand characteristics of a post-industrial economy.
Nuclear utilities alone did not create this new environment.
Rather, they are the most visible and logical consequence of a capi-
talist and industrial expansionist ideology. Both the traditional ec-
onomic model and the regulatory response to that model are artifi-
cial constructs that are based on a policy commitment to large,
high technology, central power stations. Clearly, nuclear power
plants fit that image. Equally clearly, that image is wrong in a
more competitive market and in a political milieu not uniformly
committed to nuclear power. If utilities can begin to cope with un-
anticipated expenses in a thoughtful, planned manner, nuclear
utilities may be given the opportunity to reemerge in a newly
evolving, more competitive post-industrial market.'26 The remain-
ing question is: What should be done with the massive, mistaken
investments in nuclear power? This Article addresses that question
next. In answering that question, this Article begins to develop a
replacement for the traditional model.
125. For a discussion of the importance of utility efforts to encourage customers to con-
serve electricity, see Lovins, Saving Gigabucks with Negawatts, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 21,
1985, at 19.
126. See supra notes 40 and 41 and accompanying text.
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III. REGULATORY RESPONSES TO NUCLEAR MARKET FAILURE
A. Introduction
To satisfy their unprecedented revenue requirements-which in-
ternal and external funding sources could not satisfy-utilities
turned to state and federal regulators. 2 7 These regulators were
caught in an environment that was changing politically as well as
economically. The once unified promotional nuclear policy began
splintering badly, particularly after TMI, and electricity costs were
escalating rapidly. State public utility commissions responded by
being more politicized than at any other time in their history.2 s
These once dormant bodies, which were the refuge of political pa-
tronage, awoke and became quite activist. 2 9 Armed with the tradi-
tional model of utility regulation, public utility commissions were
presented with anything but traditional questions in an uncertain
market. Specifically, they were being asked to save large central
power stations by levying the costs of mistaken investment on
ratepayers.
The existence of nuclear transformation is evidenced by the fact
that during this transition period nuclear regulation confronts a
duality between capital expansion rate making and competitive
127. Note that public utilities commissions do not regulate in isolation. Rather, energy
policy is the result of a complex institutional process. See generally Tomain, supra note 9
(discussing the impact of the Law-Policy conflict on energy policy). In particular, the legisla-
tive and judicial branches check public utilities commissions. For a description of current
utility legislation, see Olson, supra note 118.
128. See D. ANDERSON, REGULATORY POLITICS AND ELECTRIC UTILITIES: A CASE STUDY IN
POLITICAL ECONOMY 33-88 (1981); W. GORMLEY, THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION
(1983); P. NAVARRO, supra note 99, 95-109; P. NAVARRO, THE POLICY GAM& How SPECIAL
INTERESTS AND IDEOLOGUES ARE STEALING AMERICA 155-81 (1984); Wiens, Citizen Perspective
in the Wolf Creek Rate Case, 33 U. KAN. L. REV. 469 (1985).
129. The activism manifested itself in more contentious public utilities commission hear-
ings. Commissioners became more vocal on such issues as the need for power, conservation,
and environmental matters. Public participation increased as interest groups organized in
response to escalating costs. See D. ANDERSON, supra note 128; W. GORMLEY, supra note 128;
P. NAVARRO, supra note 128. See generally J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 44-62 (1965) (discussing
how individuals decide to organize and take collective action); L OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) (discussing collective
action).
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rate making.130 The central conflict between these two rate-making
modes is that the desire to protect consumers confronts the per-
ceived need to shelter investors.
Although this conflict between ratepayers and shareholders may
appear easy to balance with a "split the difference" attitude insti-
tutionalized as policy,' such an approach is impossible to recon-
cile as a matter of economic theory. No economic model,3 2 no mat-
130. A policy transition can be analogized to the classic example of the middle period in
the development of a common law rule:
Once a rule has been announced, its second stage begins during which cases are
included within and without the rule, distinctions become fuzzy and sometimes
contradictory, and reasoning is questionable. All of which leads to the demise
and replacement of the rule. The hallmark of this phase of rule development is
a certain amount of lumpiness. Some lumpiness (more charitably, flexibility) is
healthy because the dynamic of the process allows law to adapt. Too much
flexibility is properly characterized as confusion, and this is an unhealthy state
in which the dynamic of the law breaks down.
Tomain, Contract Compensation in Nonmarket Transactions, 46 U. Prrr. L. REv. 867, 890-
91 (1985) (footnotes ommitted) (based on B. CARUozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PRO-
cass (1921); E. LEvi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949); K. LLEWELLYN, THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION DECIDING APPEALS (1960)).
131. In fact, the Illinois legislature has adopted just such a position by promulgating a
statute that directs the Illinois Commerce Commission to initiate rule-making proceedings
to establish factors for allocating plant cancellation costs between shareholders and ratepay-
ers. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, 9-216 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); see also ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 52-B (Supp. 1986) ("In determining the ratemaking treatment for a
utility's investment in cancelled or abandoned electric generating facilities, the commission
shall balance the interests of the utility and ratepayers in a just and reasonable manner in
each individual case.").
132. A graphic economic model is presented in Averbach & Freireich, Nuclear Cancella-
tions: Economic and Legal Bases for Allocating Losses, in MSU PUBLIC UTILITIES PAPERS,
AWARD PAPERS IN PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS AND REGULATION 325, 333-39 (1982). The au-
thors define their model as:
Costs incurred for cancelled nuclear projects should be borne by sharehold-
ers and ratepayers in a manner reflecting the benefits each group would ulti-
mately have received from a completed, operational plant. Costs, in other
words, should be borne in the same proportion as benefits would have been
enjoyed.
Once the appropriate allocation of costs has been derived, a mechanism is
required to effect the proper sharing. The method we propose is to allow recov-
ery by the company of its sunk principal through amortization, but to disallow
any rate base treatment, interest allowance, or carrying charges on the unam-
ortized balance. By choosing a given amortization period and calculating the
value to the company of the amount recovered from ratepayers over that term,
one achieves a sharing of costs in the desired proportion.
Id. at 327.
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ter how loosely one uses the term "economic," can continually and
consistently reconcile the competing claims of shareholders and
ratepayers because these claims are, at bottom, mutually exclusive.
The reconciliation that does work is essentially political. Accord-
ingly, it dispenses with the necessity of developing a theory of reg-
ulation dependent upon a rigid economic calculus. This political
response is "accommodationist.' ' 3 3 The accommodationist re-
The authors rely on noneconomic as well as economic justifications for their model,
however:
The merit of this proposal rests on several bases: (1) it is in accordance with
established economic theory and principles; (2) it is in accordance with estab-
lished principles of utility regulation; (3) it is in agreement with recent com-
mission decisions involving cancelled nuclear plants; (4) it would promote the
important public policy of encouraging large capital expenditures by utilities
only for undertakings showing the highest promise of success; and (5) it is
equitable.
Id.
At the conclusion of their article, the authors say their model (1) allows prudent costs and
(2) disallows items not used and useful. Note, however, that they offer no economic theory
to justify the allowance of sunk costs but not carrying costs. See also Stutz, Risk Sharing in
a Regulatory Industry, PuB. Urm. FORT., Apr. 3, 1986, at 29 (arguing that ratepayers and
shareholders should split costs because the utilities' service obligation imposes more risk on
shareholders to the benefit of the ratepayers).
133. "Accommodation" is a political response grounded on a pragmatic justification. See,
e.g., Galbraith, The Stockman Episode (Book Review), N.Y. REv. BooKs, June 26, 1986, at
3:
The point has often been made: If you hear someone in public life say that
he is going to stand firmly on principle, you should take cover and warn others
to do the same. There is going to be suffering. So it is, at least, in economic and
social policy and action.
This is not to say that stalwart ideological commitment is without purpose.
A commitment to free enterprise or socialism, to liberalism, neoliberalism, con-
servatism, neoconservatism, or the new right, is eminently serviceable to self-
esteem and as a form of self-identification. It also allows a certain freedom
from thought: "That is my position and I stand by it." And it helpfully classi-
fies political expression and behavior, makes it more predictable, and serves to
unite people in a highly visible way beneath a common banner. Further, ideol-
ogy brings a dignified righteousness to social, political, and economic expres-
sion and action: "I am, let me assure you, faithful to my cause."
What is less often recognized is that rigorous ideological commitment is of
greatly negative value for governing a country, especially for making economic
policy, and is a positive threat to social tranquility and economic well-being.
Economic and social institutions are in a constant process of change; ideologi-
cal commitment, by its nature and strongly avowed virtue, is static. Accord-
ingly, guidance therefrom is likely to be obsolete, obsolescent, or irrelevant.
Never is it so comprehensive in guidance as to take account of the greatly di-
verse circumstances of real life. The United States has survived, at least until
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sponse is temporary and transitional. Its intended purpose is to
allocate immediate losses between ratepayers and shareholders as a
matter of political judgment, not rational economic theory-build-
ing. The accommodationist response, although economically un-
sound, is nevertheless valuable. It provides a critique of the tradi-
tional model and provides a base for the development of the post-
industrial model. State and federal responses to nuclear market
failure serve as a prelude to Part IV of this Article, which analyzes
the lessons of the nuclear transition and argues that the accom-
modationist response is a political antecedent to a more responsive
regulatory theory in a changing economic world.
B. State Responses
State responses to mistaken nuclear investment'34 can be di-
vided into three categories: those that protect consumers; those
that protect owners; and those that balance and distribute the fi-
nancial burden between ratepayers and shareholders. In making
cost allocation decisions, regulators first rely on explicit statutory
language. Next, in the absence of clear language, regulators inter-
now, by the willingness of governments, large and small, to make practical con-
cessions to change and to diversity. A reluctant pragmatism has been our
salvation.
See also S. BOWLEs & H. GiNTrls, DEMOCRACY AND CAPITALISM: PROPERTY, COMMUNITY, AND
THE CONTRADICTIONS OF MODERN THOUGHT 33-34 (1986) (accommodation serves as a centrip-
etal force holding together conflicts between economics and politics, money and power, and
property and rights).
134. This Article defines "mistaken nuclear investment" to include cancelled plants, ex-
cess capacity, and underestimation of construction costs. See supra notes 111-13 and accom-
panying text. This section concentrates on cancelled plant decisions, and serves as a textual
elaboration of the Appendix, which lists 56 cancelled nuclear plant decisions and charts
their dispositions. The issue is: Who pays for mistaken nuclear investment? Three principle
cost-bearing groups exist- ratepayers, shareholders, and taxpayers.
NUCLEAR PLANT CANCELLATIONS, supra note 14, at 71 states:
A present-value analysis of the costs allocated to the three major payer groups
for a hypothetical plant cancellation involving amortization over 10 years, with
no return on the unamortized balance, yielded the following approximate dis-
tribution of costs: utility investors, 30 percent; utility ratepayers, 30 percent;
and income taxpayers, 40 percent.
Each of these groups has a sound justification for escaping liability, yet no group remains
unaffected as regulators roughly apportion costs. Utilities argue that they were following
government commands; ratepayers argue that they are receiving no benefits; and taxpayers
argue that they are scapegoats. See Tomain, Law and Policy in the Activist State: Rethink-
ing Nuclear Regulation, supra note 3, at 212-34.
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pret the pertinent statutes and case law and support their inter-
pretations with policy arguments. The basic choice of decisional
rules is between the "used and useful" test or the "prudent man-
agement" test.13 5 The used and useful test protects ratepayers
from absorbing cancellation costs. The prudent investment test
protects shareholders from suffering extraordinary losses. Finally,
regulators rely on analogous statutes to dispose of these issues.
1. Consumer Protection
States protect consumers generally for one or both of two rea-
sons. First, they may feel compelled to adopt and rigidly apply the
used and useful test. Rigid application of this test means that a
plant must be on-line and operating with benefits to consumers
before the utility can pass costs through by inclusion in the rate
base. Second, these states may reach beyond specific statutory lan-
guage and consider the issue of risk allocation. Consumer protec-
tionist states accept the proposition that costs should be allocated
to cost-bearing groups in direct proportion to the amount of as-
sumed risk. Because ratepayers have little voice in the decision to
embark on new projects, and utilities themselves reap the ultimate
rewards if projects are successful, then utilities should bear the fi-
nancial burden if projects fail.
In Office of Consumers' Counsel v. Public Utilities Commis-
sion,13 6 the Ohio Supreme Court became the first state high court
to exclude cancellation costs from the rate base. This decision is
representative of the consumer protectionist position. The court
based its decision on statutory language that allowed the utility to
recover only the cost of rendering the public utility service for the
test period. Although the Public Utilities Commission applied the
prudent management test, the court reasoned that a utility is not
given rate base treatment for property not actually used and useful
in providing the public with utility services.137 If the Public Utili-
ties Commission and the utilities themselves needed financial re-
lief, they should seek it from the legislature. "Absent such explicit
135. Colton, Excess Capacity: Who Gets the Charge from the Power Plant?, supra note
35, at 1137-41.
136. 67 Ohio St. 2d 153, 423 N.E.2d 820 (1981), appeal dismissed, 455 U.S. 914 (1982).
137. Id. at 163-68, 423 N.E.2d at 826-29.
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statutory authorization, however," the court said, "the commission
may not benefit the investors by guaranteeing the full return of
their capital at the expense of the ratepayers.' 113
Although Ohio consistently has prevented costs associated with
failed nuclear plants from being included in the rate base,139 it has
not retained an absolutely strict adherence to consumer protection.
The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that the Public Utilities Com-
mission has discretion to consider disallowance of cancelled plant
costs when determining a fair and reasonable rate of return.40 The
Ohio Public Utilities Commission has acknowledged expressly the
technique of raising rates of return to accommodate rate base dis-
allowances as a means of aiding utilities faced with cancelled nu-
clear projects.'41 As a result, even states that explicitly adopt a
consumer protectionist stance 142 feel compelled to accommodate
the industry in recognition of their financial needs.
138. Id. at 167, 423 N.E.2d at 829.
139. See, e.g., Columbus & S. Ohio Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 10 Ohio St. 3d 12,
460 N.E.2d 1108 (1984) (upholding a construction work in progress disallowance regarding
the cancelled Zimmer nuclear plant); Toledo Edison Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 12 Ohio St.
3d 143, 465 N.E.2d 886 (1984) (disallowing operating expenses for a cancelled unit).
140. "The question whether a decision of this court may have so increased the perceived
risk to investors as to require a higher rate of return on common equity is one the commis-
sion may consider as a factor in its decision." Consumers' Counsel v. Public Util. Comm'n, 4
Ohio St. 3d 111, 115, 447 N.E.2d 749, 754 (1983).
141. Cleveland Illuminating Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 63 (Ohio PUC 1982).
142. Several states, as reported in cases in the Appendix, follow Ohio in seeking to protect
consumers from bearing the financial burden of nuclear plant cancellations. Wyoming, Ore-
gon, Montana, New Hampshire, Indiana, and Pennsylvania use statutory language to pro-
tect consumers from bearing the costs of plant cancellations. Wyoming expressly incorpo-
rates the "used and useful" concept in its statute requiring the utility commission to
"consider... the property and business of any public utility used and useful for the conve-
nience of the public .... " Wyo. STAT. § 37-2-119 (Supp. 1986). Under this rationale, Wyo-
ming's Supreme Court denied recovery from ratepayers for the costs of cancelling the Peb-
ble Springs and WPN-4 and -5 nuclear power plants because they never came on line.
Pacific Power & Light v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 677 P.2d 799 (Wyo. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 836 (1985).
Oregon, under "Ballot Measure 9," denies utilites rate collection derived from any prop-
erty "not presently used for providing utility service to the customer." OR. REV. STAT. § 757-
355 (1983). Though two Oregon utilities requested rate relief to compensate for cancellation
costs at SkagittlHanford and WPN-5, the Oregon Public Utilities Commission refused re-
covery of those costs incurred after passage of Ballot Measure 9. It granted "prospective"
relief to consumers because at the time "utility management was fully aware that its invest-
ment was a risk and the previous risk-sharing relationship between investors had been al-
tered." Anticipated Abandonment of Electricity Generating Plant Projects by Portland
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The pressure for financial aid is strong. If a nuclear project is
cancelled in a state following the used or useful test, the utility has
an incentive to convert to another resource, such as coal, in order
to put a plant on-line. In Ohio, Cincinnati Gas & Electric, Dayton
Power & Light, and Columbus & Southern Ohio Electric cancelled
the ninety-seven percent complete Zimmer plant after conducting
an audit that indicated that $1.8 billion, in addition to the $1.7
billion already spent, was needed to complete construction of the
plant. Even though state law precluded rate base treatment of can-
cellation costs, and a consulting report sponsored by the public
utilities commission detailed mismanagement in the construction
of the nuclear plant,143 the threat of coal conversion, which would
cost another $1.7 billion, pressured consumers into absorbing some
costs through a negotiated settlement.144
Regulators also offer policy considerations to support consumer
protection. They stress that even though the service obligation dis-
tinguishes utilities from nonregulated industries, utility investment
involves less risk than investments in nonregulated businesses. Al-
lowing recovery from ratepayers of all losses incurred by utilities
expands the monopoly advantage to the point where investments
would become risk-free.1 45 If consumers bear all costs, then no risk
is placed on shareholders. Utilities therefore would be encouraged
to "venture into activities having a very small chance of economic
success [because they have] the knowledge of no loss [to the util-
General Elec. Co. and Pacific Power & Light Co., [State Transfer Binder 1983-85] Util. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 24,202, at 57,236 (Or. PUC Dec. 27, 1983); see also Portland General Elec.
Co., 49 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 274 (Or. PSC 1982) (PG&E's writeoff of its $132 million
interest in Pebble Springs was absorbed by the utility, not the ratepayers.); cf. IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 8-1-2-1, 8-1-2-4 (Burns Supp. 1986); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 69-3-109 (1985); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 378:30-a (1984); 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1313 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
143. O'BRIEN-KREITZBERG & AssocIATES, INC., WM. H. ZIMMER NucLEAR POWER STATION:
ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE MISMANAGEMENT AND CORRELATED COST Executive Summary (June 15,
1984) (copy on file with authors). "Cincinnati Gas & Electric is responsible for substantial
mismanagement in the design and construction of the Zimmer Nuclear Generating Station."
Id. at 2-3. "[T]he estimated cost of mismanagement for this option [cancellation] is
$1,720,000,000 to March 31, 1984. Because of caretaking cost of AFUDC, this cost will con-
tinue to grow." Id. at 2-8.
144. Restatement of the Accounts and Records of the Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., [State
Decisions Current] Util. L. Rep. 1 24,963 (Ohio PUC Nov. 26, 1985).
145. See Pacific Power & Light Co., 53 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 24, 28 (Mont. PSC
1983).
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ity] should the activity fail and great gain should the small chance
of success occur.'146
Another policy consideration for regulators is the lack of public
participation in investment decisions. Because the public fre-
quently is precluded from accepting, rejecting, or commenting on
utility building decisions, this argument holds that the rate-paying
public should not bear the burden of isolated management con-
struction decisions.147 Instead, regulators reason, stockholders
should carry investment responsibility. Stockholders, as owners of
utilities, choose the managers of their utility and thereby maintain
a voice in utility management. The planning of construction of new
units is a management function under control of the stockholders
"[who] should therefore bear any cost related to such
cancellations."' 4
Decision makers also frequently note that utilities inadequately
justify expenses incurred from plant construction. Accordingly,
when utilities cannot defend the prudence of incurred costs, com-
missions have denied rate base recovery. 149 Even when public utili-
ties commissions incorporate costs of plants not used and useful in
the rate base, they cannot pass through expenses imprudently in-
146. Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 677 P.2d 799, 806 (Wyo. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 836 (1985).
147. Id.
148. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co., 38 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 547, 556 (Ariz. Corp. Comm'n
1980). For examples of anti-construction work in progress statutes, see Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 393.135 (Vernon Supp. 1986); 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1315 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
Furthermore, the Montana Public Service Commission reasoned that it would be "pa-
tently unfair" to force ratepayers to carry the financial burden of plant cancellations which
"they had no part in conceiving, which failed through no fault of theirs, and which will
never benefit them." Pacific Power & Light Co., 53 Pub. Util Rep. 4th (PUR) 24, 29 (Mont.
PSC 1983).
149. See Connecticut Light & Power Co., Nos. 810602 and 810604 (Conn. DPUC Westlaw,
Pub. Util. Rep. Com. file 1981) (all expenses denied after commission determined project ill-
advised); Washington Water Power Co., 65 Pub. Util Rep. 4th (PUR) 100, 125 (Idaho PUC
1985) (all costs denied after Dec. 31, 1981, because imprudently incurred); Union Elec. Co.,
53 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 565, 592 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n 1983) (all uncertain costs
denied); Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 471 (Mass. DPU 1982) (ex-
penses incurred after July 1, 1980, denied because imprudently incurred); Houston Lighting
& Power Co., 50 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 157, 201 (Tex. PUC 1982) (costs incurred after
Jan. 1, 1980, denied as imprudent expenditures); Washington Utils. & Transp. Comm'n v.
Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 62 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 557, 585 (Wash. UTC 1984)
(all authorized funding used during construction denied after June 30, 1980).
[Vol. 28:363
1987] NUCLEAR TRANSITION
curred by the utility.150 Because of the difficulty in reconstructing
the economic, social, and political climate in which the utility for-
mulated its original decision to build, however, decision makers
have utilized the imprudence concept only infrequently.151
When statutes do not specifically require the application of the
used and useful test, some commissions and courts have relied on
other statutes to determine legislative intent. The New Hampshire
legislature, for example, adopted an anti-construction work in pro-
gress statute to prevent construction work in progress from being
included in the rate base until construction is complete. 2 Al-
though the language focuses strictly on construction work in pro-
gress, the New Hampshire Supreme Court interpreted the statute
as preventing rate base treatment of cancellation costs incurred af-
ter its passage.1 53 Conversely, Indiana has a statute that can be in-
terpreted reasonably as allowing public utilities commissions to ac-
commodate both ratepayers and shareholders in cost allocations,
yet the state Supreme Court refused to allow the utility to pass
abandonment costs through to ratepayers.154
States that protect consumers from costs of nuclear facilities
that are not used and useful follow similar reasoning when the can-
150. The New York Public Service Commission, for example, ruled that $1.395 billion of
Shoreham nuclear power station overruns must be recovered from Long Island Lighting
Co.'s shareholders, not ratepayers, because of imprudent management. Long Island Lighting
Co.-Phase II-Proceeding on Motion of Comm'n to Investigate Cost of Constr. on Shore-
ham Nuclear Generating Facility, [State Decisions Current] Util. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 24,922, at
60,557 (N.Y. PSC Dec. 16, 1985); see also Lilco is Blamed for $1.2 Billion of Shoreham
Overrun, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1985, at B2, col. 1.
151. Small, FERC Electric Rate Primer, 5 ENERGY L.J. 107, 110 & n.18 (1984).
152. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 378: 30-a (1984).
153. Public Serv. Co. of N.H., 125 N.H. 46, 480 A.2d 20 (1984). Missouri adopted a stat-
ute modelled after the New Hampshire anti-construction work in progress legislation. The
Missouri Supreme Court interpreted the statute as distinguishing between construction
work in progress and cancellation costs, however, and thus permitted inclusion of the can-
cellation costs in the rate base. Missouri ex rel. Union Elec. Co. v. Missouri Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 687 S.W.2d 162 (Mo. 1985).
154. Indiana's Supreme Court refused to allow full recovery of Bailly N-1 nuclear plant
costs over a 15-year amortization period. The Indiana court applied the "used and useful"
statutory standard for establishing reasonable costs and thus disallowed pass-through of
costs even though the statute arguably permits the public utilities commission to make ac-
commodations in setting rates. Citizens Action Coalition of Ind., Inc. v. Northern Ind. Pub.
Serv. Co., 485 N.E.2d 610, 616-17 (Ind. 1985). The statute defined utility service to include
the "use or accommodation afforded consumers .. ." IND. CODE ANN. § 8-1-2-1 (Burns
Supp. 1986).
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cellation is only temporary. Pennsylvania faced this dilemma in
dealing with the accident at Three Mile Island. During the "down-
time" of the TMI units, the public utilities commission reduced
utility rates because the plant was not "used and useful." The util-
ity objected, arguing that rates must be set at levels preserving its
financial integrity. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court disagreed
and indicated that utilities do not have a constitutionally guaran-
teed right to rates that preserve positive financial status for utili-
ties; any other result, the court reasoned, would make rate base
determinations concerning used and useful plants superfluous. 155
Consumer protectionism is based on statutory and policy argu-
ments emanating from the used and useful test. Ratepayers should
not pay when they receive no electricity. Ratepayers receive no
electricity when utilities cancel plants, over-build or when plants
are under construction. The consumer protectionist position also
has a long-run economic efficiency argument. If ratepayers subsi-
dize mistaken financial decisions, then overinvestment-waste-is
encouraged.
2. Investor Protection
Not all regulatory authorities believe that utilities should bear
the entire burden of the decision to invest in nuclear plants. Some
public utilities commissions 56 follow a philosophy that consumers
benefit even from cancelled plants because utilities are honoring
their service obligation by providing system reliability. As a result,
the costs of cancelled plants are included in the rate base and
155. Pennsylvania Elec. Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 509 Pa. 324, 502 A.2d
130 (1985); see also Barasch v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 507 Pa. 496, 491 A.2d 94
(1985); Barasch v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 507 Pa. 430, 490 A.2d 806 (1985). Simi-
larly, California's Public Utilities Commission lowered the rate base when Pacific Gas &
Electric closed the Humboldt Plant for refueling and seismic modifications. Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co., 34 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 1, 23-24 (Cal. PUC 1979). The issue concerning
whether public utilities commissions must preserve the financial integrity of the regulated
utility or may disallow costs attributable to imprudence, excess physical capacity, and ex-
cess economic expenses is currently before the Supreme Court in Kansas Gas & Elec. v.
Kansas Corp. Comm'n, 239 Kan. 483, 720 P.2d 1063 (1986), appeal granted, 107 S. Ct. 1281
(1987).
156. See, e.g., Gulf Power Co., 43 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 15, 17 (Fla. PSC 1981), aff'd,
410 So.2d 492, 494 (Fla. 1982); Maine Pub. Serv. Co., 67 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 101, 117
(Me. PUC 1985); Rochester Gas & Elec. Co., 45 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 386, 399 (N.Y.
PSC 1982).
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passed through to consumers. States that adopt a systemic, rather
than a project specific, approach to cancellation costs utilize a
prudency standard. Under this approach, the state disallows some
imprudent costs on specific projects even though it generally in-
cludes cancellation costs in the rate base.157 Investor protection
states rest on the service obligation argument.
Utilities argue that because they incurred costs of cancelled
plants as part of their service obligation, the public should share in
these costs. They reason that market risk analysis is inapplicable
because, unlike competitive industries, utilities are not free to close
shop; consumers have a legal right to demand service. Because
ratepayers enjoy the benefits of a system of readily available elec-
tricity, they should share in the risk that a specific project can fail.
As policy support for investor protection, regulators note that at
the time nuclear plant construction was begun, the federal govern-
ment was vigorously promoting the development of nuclear power.
In the 1970s, the energy crisis and the resulting need to become
less dependent on foreign oil increased reliance on nuclear power.
Some public utilities commissions hesitate to deny financial assis-
tance to a utility when they find that the decision to build the
plant was a prudent effort to fulfill the utility's service obligation
to the public, particularly when nuclear power was so promoted.
Prudently incurred cancellation costs should be given rate base
treatment, therefore, as should cost overruns and excess capacity.
Once regulators decide to have ratepayers absorb cancellation
costs, two basic ways exist to structure recovery: costs can be in-
cluded in the rate base, or amortized over a period of years. The
choice of method turns on the amount that the utilities requested.
Small amounts either will be included in the rate base or given
short amortization periods as depicted by the cases in the Appen-
dix. An important subsidiary issue arises if costs are amortized:
Should the utility earn a return on the unamortized balance? In-
157. New York's Public Service Commission, for example, follows the practice of allowing
full recovery of all sunk costs, including carrying charges. The New York commission re-
jected the idea that costs of the abandoned Sterling nuclear project should be allocated
between ratepayers and shareholders according to benefits each would have received had the
project been completed and instead put the burden on ratepayers entirely. In other words, it
rejected the Averbach & Freireich model, supra note 132, in Central Hudson Gas & Elec., 67
Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 459, 468 (N.Y. PSC 1985).
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vestor protectionists argue that utilities should earn a return, oth-
erwise they are denied full recovery of their investment. 5 ' Because
principal and interest costs exist to be allocated, regulators can ad-
just these variables when they desire to allocate costs between
ratepayers and shareholders.
3. Accommodation
Amortizing cancellation costs, the method used by most states
and the federal government, 159 balances costs between ratepayers
and shareholders. Once the public utilities commission determines
that ratepayers will accept some responsibility, various allocation
schemes are available. Most commissions note the nonrecurring
nature of construction expenses and allow utilities to recoup costs
through the rate base. This method gives investors a rate of return
on at least the prudently incurred costs. Another method classifies
cancellation costs as expenses, as opposed to providing rate base
treatment, and subsequently amortizes the amount.
Cash flow improves for utilities with shorter amortization peri-
ods and with rate base treatment of the unamortized balance.
Ratepayers argue that if plant costs are amortized, the period
should be longer in order to prevent rate shock. Utilities counter,
however, that they need to recover invested costs as quickly as pos-
sible to keep a tenable cash flow and to maintain financial health.
No predetermined method exists for determining amortization pe-
riods. On the whole, the length of time can vary from one to three
years 60 up to ten, fifteen, or twenty years.' 6 1 Inconsistency some-
158. Gary & Roach, supra note 115, at 486-506 (arguing for inclusion of all prudently
incurred cancellation costs in the rate base and a return on the unamortized balance).
159. See Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
860 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1987); South Dakota Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Federal Energy Regula-
tory Comm'n, 690 F.2d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1982); New England Power Co., [Federal New
Matters Current] Util. L. Rep. (CCH) 13,064, at 19,350 (FERC July 24, 1985); Rochester
Gas & Elec. Corp., 45 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 386, 405 (N.Y. PSC 1982).
160. See United Illuminating Co., 55 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 252, 294 (Conn. DPUC
1983); Maine Pub. Serv. Co., 67 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 101, 118 (Me. PUC 1985); Fitch-
burg Gas & Elec. Light Co., 52 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 197, 221 (Mass. DPU 1983);
Commonwealth Elec. Co., 47 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 229, 237 (Mass. DPU 1982); North-
ern States Power Co., 42 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 339, 363 (Minn. PUC 1981); Wisconsin
Pub. Serv. Corp., 52 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 389, 394 (Wis. PSC 1983).
161. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 730 F.2d 816,
820 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated, 768 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1985); United Illuminating Co., 64
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times exists within states regarding the length of amortization pe-
riods. 162 Variable amortization recovery times demonstrate not
only that public utilities commissions are examining different con-
siderations for different plants, but also that uncertainty exists
among the public utilities commissions regarding the regulatory
theory underpinning particular choices.
A second and significant decision facing public utilities commis-
sions is how to allocate the unamortized balance of costs.1 6 3 The
Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 319, 341 (Conn. DPU 1984); Potomac Elec. Power Co., 29 Pub.
Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 517, 528-29 (D.C. PSC 1979); Washington Water Power Co., 65 Pub.
Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 100, 119 (Idaho PUC 1985); Detroit Edison Co., 52 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 318, 326 (Mich. PSC 1983); Carolina Power & Light Co., 49 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 188, 218 (N.C. Utils. Comm'n 1982); Atlanta City Electric Co., 51 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 109, 115 (N.J. Bd. Pub. Utils. 1983); Houston Lighting & Power Co., 50 Pub. Util.
Rep. 4th (PUR) 157, 200 (Tex. PUC 1982); Virginia Elec. Power Co., 54 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 1, 13 (W. Va. PSC 1983).
162. The Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control, like New York's Public Ser-
vice Commission, has placed the burden of loss on consumers. The Department allowed
United Illuminating Co. to recover $14.7 million of costs for Pilgrim Unit 11 by amortization
over a two-year period, but allowed a 10-year amortization period for a $200 million invest-
ment in another plant. The Department rejected arguments that the utility should not re-
cover costs because the unit had never been "used and useful," that the company's financial
integrity was not endangered, and that the utility was bound by earlier representations that
it would bear the loss if the unit was not completed. Instead, the Department reasoned that
because United Illuminating acted reasonably and with the Department's approval, it
should not be penalized if it was satisfying obligations of law. United Illuminating Co., 55
Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 252, 268 (Conn. DPUC 1983). In a later case, the Department
treated cancellation costs differently and allowed a utility full recovery of expenses, except
for carrying charges on the unamortized portion. United Illuminating Co., 64 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) 319, 340-41 (Conn. DPUC 1984).
In Massachusetts, the Department of Public Utilities has varied between amortization
periods of three and 10 years. See, e.g., Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR)
431, 473 (Mass. DPU 1982) (amortization of 13 years for Pilgrim II); Commonwealth Elec.
Co., 47 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 229, 233 (Mass. DPU 1982) (amortization of three years
for Montague I). In Washington, the amortization period has fluctuated between zero and 10
years. See, e.g., Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n v. Puget Sound Power & Light, 62
Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 557, 586 (Wash. UTC 1984) (amortization period of 10 years for
Pebble Springs plant); Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n v. Puget Sound Power & Light,
51 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 158, 168-82 (Wash. UTC 1983) (amortization period of zero
years for Pebble Springs and WNP-5 plants; instead, 2.5% added to the rate of return).
163. If, hypothetically, a utility is confronting $1,000,000 in cancelled plant costs and the
public utilities commission agrees to a 10-year amortization period, then in year 1, $100,000
will be included in the rate base but the interest on the remaining $900,000 will also need
regulatory attention. In year 2, another $100,000 will be treated in the rate base, but the
$800,000 remaining will again be earning interest charges that must be paid. The example
goes on through the 10-year period with the utility acquiring cumulative carrying charges
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ultimate investor protection is to give rate base treatment to the
unamortized balance as well as to cancellation costs.6 4 The major-
ity of states divide the burden of cancellation costs between inves-
tors and ratepayers by amortizing costs but denying rate base
treatment for the unamortized balance. Although the policy behind
this allocation is easy to state, the precise theory on which the allo-
cations rest is not so easy to identify. Consumers want reasonable
rates and reliable service; utilities want financial health; and inves-
tors want a return on investment. Furthermore, consumer protec-
tion may harm utilities, and shareholder protection requires subsi-
dization by ratepayers. The natural tendency is to develop an
accommodationist position that attempts to protect both interests.
Amortizing or expensing prudently incurred costs helps sharehold-
ers. Denying rate base treatment for the unamortized balance does
not penalize ratepayers unnecessarily. In addition, threats of bank-
ruptcy and service interruption have persuaded some public utili-
because of interest incurred by the unamortized balance of cancellation costs. The burden is
alleviated, however, if this amount is given rate base treatment.
The Maine Public Utilities Commission has a policy of allocating the costs of cancelled
plants between shareholders and ratepayers by allowing amortization without rate base
treatment of only that part of the investment that does not constitute capitalized "Allow-
ance for Funds Used During Construction" (AFUDC). Central Me. Power Co. v. Maine Pub.
Util. Comm'n, 433 A.2d 331, 334 (Me. 1981); Bangor Hydro-Electric Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) 503, 557-58 (Me. PUC 1982). In the case of a cancelled plant, AFUDC represents
the carrying costs of a plant that will never provide service. The Public Utilities Commis-
sion decided that a reasonable balancing of the burden of the cancelled plant required
shareholders to shoulder all carrying costs. The Commission refused to disallow only the
equity portion of AFUDC because the "equitable share of risk that should be borne by
investors is the risk of loss of the expected return on the investment." Id. at 557. This
includes the return on debt as well as on equity.
Distinguishing between debt and equity has superficial appeal. Bondholders should be
protected more than shareholders, the argument goes, because shareholders are the owners
of the utility and bondholders are only lenders. The argument makes less sense when one
realizes that both bondholders and shareholders assess risk based on the same information
about capital structure, financial risk, and liability.
164. Several states follow this investor protectionist method: Florida, in Gulf Power Co.,
43 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 15, 16 (Fla. PSC 1981), aff'd, 410 So. 2d 492, 494 (Fla. 1982);
Maine, in Maine Pub. Serv. Co., 67 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 101, 118 (Me. PUC 1985);
New York, in Rochester Gas & Elec. Co., 45 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 386, 411 (N.Y. PSC
1982); and North Carolina, in Carolina Power & Light Co., 49 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR)
188, 217 (N.C. Utils. Comm'n 1982).
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ties commissions to allow recovery of some abandonment costs or
to grant emergency rate hikes.'65
Although states articulate and apply different rules, they are
also reevaluating the nature of public utilities as regulated monop-
olies. As the Vermont Public Service Board put it:
How to treat the loss of abandoned plant presents one of the
fundamental regulatory paradoxes. Regulation's role is to supply
the discipline of the marketplace to a monopoly that provides an
essential service. If an unregulated company subject to competi-
tion makes a bad investment, the company is unable to pass
that along to its customers and its shareholders suffer from de-
creased earnings or from the ultimate economic fate of bank-
ruptcy. On the other hand, an unregulated company can also
earn "surpluses" above the average return in the industry which
will cushion it in hard times. However, if a regulated company
providing an essential service makes an investment that is later
abandoned, to disallow it completely and reduce earnings only
raises the cost of debt and equity to the company, and this cost
is passed along to customers in the long run. 6
In allocating losses between ratepayers and investors, public utili-
ties commissions try to balance the utilities' burdens as a regulated
industry against their privileges as monopolies. 67
165. See, e.g., Application of Consumers Power Co. for Authorization to Increase Its
Rates Applicable to the Sale of Electricity, [State Transfer Binder 1983-1985] Util. L. Rep.
(CCH) T 24,675 (Mich. PSC March 29, 1985).
166. Central Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 49 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 372, 392 (Vt. PSB 1982).
167. See Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 461 (Mass. DPU 1982),
afl'd sub nom. Attorney General v. Department of Pub. Utils., 390 Mass. 208, 455 N.E.2d
414 (1983). The Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (MDPU) directly confronted
the nature of accommodation:
The primary mandate that rates balance the interests of consumers and in-
vestors must be applied here based upon our judgement of the appropriate
factors that affect such a balancing. It seems indisputable to us that no mathe-
matical formula, including one that evenly divides dollar losses, can properly
and logically effect a meaningful balance of interests. After considerable re-
view, we have concluded that the factors which properly bear on the allocation
of the loss at issue here are the following.
a. the prudence of the company's actions throughout the history of the project;
b. the equity and fairness of any proposed allocation; and
c. the necessity of adjusting the financial impacts of any allocation to ensure
the adequacy of future service.
46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 461.
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The accommodationist position, which balances the interests of
ratepayers and shareholders, is also reproduced in regulatory deci-
sions regarding construction work in progress"'8 and excess capac-
ity. 6" Although no uniform rule exists for regulatory treatment of
either construction work in progress or excess capacity, the trend is
clear. The federal government and most states, excluding those
with specific anti-construction work in progress legislation, allow
some construction work in progress in the rate base to improve
cash flow and reduce rate shock. Similarly, the states that have
addressed the excess capacity issue allow a healthy reserve margin,
usually twenty percent, before disallowing excess capacity in the
rate base.
Who pays for mistaken investments? Through a series of accom-
modations and trade-offs, the near unanimous answer is that rate-
payers will pick up some charges and shareholders other charges.
In the process, regulators must now address how best to treat, for
rate-making purposes, large investments in long lead-time projects.
The answers that regulators are developing will directly affect the
financial structure and capital budgeting of utilities.
4. Synthesis of State Responses
The various state responses pose a seemingly intractable di-
lemma. Should consumers pay now for the construction of specific
projects that (1) may not be completed, or (2) may be used by a
different generation of consumers? Or should consumers pay to
maintain the integrity of the system as a trade-off for the utility's
In allocating $278 million of cancellation costs, the MDPU decided to amortize over a 13-
year period the direct costs and the debt component of authorized funds used during con-
struction. The MDPU also allowed a carrying charge on the unamortized portion of the
prudent expenditures. It did not allow the unamortized portion of the plant into the rate
base, however, on the premise that the utility would regain expenses but at a lesser rate
than its allowed rate of return. Id. at 472-73.
168. See, e.g., Mid-Tex Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 773 F.2d
327, 346-47 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Illinois Power Co. [State Decisions Current] Util. L. Rep.
(CCH) V 24,794, at 59,696 (Ill. Com. Comm'n Aug. 7, 1985); Green v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util.
Comm'n, 81 Pa. Comm. 55, -, 473 A.2d 209, 214 (1984), af'd, 490 A.2d 806 (Pa. 1985).
But see People's Org. for Wash. Energy Resources v. Utilities & Transp. Comm'n, 101
Wash. 2d 425, -, 679 P.2d 922, 925 (1984) (construction work in progress not disallowed
if the plant is used and useful).
169. See Colton, Excess Capacity: A Case Study in Ratemaking Theory and Applica-
tion, supra note 35.
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service obligation? Either way somebody loses because the regula-
tory system artificially imposes the risks rather than taking them
from the market. Answering these questions depends on a frame of
reference. If the problem is analyzed from a project-specific stand-
point, then cancelled plant losses should be imposed on utilities
which undertook construction risks. In contrast, if regulators use a
systemic analysis, then ratepayers assume some risk because they
are the beneficiaries of the state-imposed service obligation. Both
arguments are partially right-and hence, partially wrong. The ar-
guments are correct insofar as each leads to a determinable answer.
The project-specific argument favors ratepayers and the systemic
argument favors shareholders in cost allocation decision making. In
the larger picture, however, both arguments are wrong because
neither produces completely sound results. Decision makers have
the discretion to choose either analysis as a justification for the
result they wish to reach. No metadecisional rule exists that re-
quires the decision maker to adopt one argument or the other. The
project-specific/systemic dichotomy is simply another version of
the mutually exclusive dualities inherent in regulatory analysis
during this transitional period.
The accommodationist attitude exhibited by the state responses
is a natural reaction to transition. Accommodation successfully at-
tempts to make decisions without a solid theory because decisions
must be made in the short-term. In a pluralistic democracy and in
an activist state, the accommodationist response is understandable
and legitimate, again in the short-term, precisely because decisions
are made. The accommodationist response is inadequate in the
long-term, however, because it is a response-an action-without a
theory. The theory that does emerge from the transition must be
based on the lessons of the transition; otherwise the accommoda-
tions go for naught. This decisional indeterminacy is constitutive
of the breakdown of institutionalized policy during a period of dy-
namic change. The way to break out of nuclear policy indetermi-
nacy is to move toward a more market-based rate making rather
than a cost-based method.
C. Federal Responses
Federal authority over cost allocation is less pervasive than the
power and authority exercised by state public utilities commis-
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sions, but it is nevertheless significant. Just as the states are not
uniform in their treatment during the transition, federal regulators
also are not of one mind. The nation responded to the TMI acci-
dent with appropriate caution. Old ways die hard, however, and
the federal regulatory structure is no more anxious to change than
any other institution. Specifically, the caution following TMI has
given way to the federal regulatory "boosterism" reminiscent of
earlier times. The judiciary, however, has been less uniform in its
response to nuclear power. In fact, the judiciary, 17 0 specifically the
170. The United States Supreme Court has been particularly active in affecting nuclear
decision-making power. Since Pacific Gas & Elec. v. State Energy Resources Conserv. &
Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983), and Silkwood v. Kerr McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984),
signalled the decentralization of decision-making power, the Supreme Court also has de-
cided three cases that recentralized power in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission by nar-
rowing the scope of judicial review. In Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear
Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983), the Court reversed the District of Columbia Circuit's determi-
nation that the National Environmental Policy Act required the NRC to consider whether
the TMI-1 restart would cause psychological damages. The Court allowed the NRC to limit
the scope of its inquiry to make its task manageable, and then reinforced the principle of
judicial deference to agencies. Id. at 776-79. Similarly, in another decision, the Court re-
versed the D.C. Circuit for failing to defer to the NRC's assessment of the environmental
effects of the back end of the fuel cycle. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103-06 (1983). Finally, in Florida Power & Light Co. v.
Lorion, 105 S. Ct. 1598 (1985), the Court resolved an appellate jurisdictional problem by
eliminating a layer of review, thus streamlining the hearing process of citizen's petitions.
Metropolitan Edison, Baltimore Gas & Electric, and Florida Power & Light dealt with a
common theme-the allocation of nuclear decision-making power in the federal system. In
each of these cases, a conflict existed between the judiciary and the NRC. Such tension
between courts and agencies as they engage in an institutional allocation of policy-making
power is more or less constant. No single institution claims preeminence; nor can a set rule
for power sharing be articulated with great precision. Instead, courts and agencies are in-
volved in a dynamic role that recognizes the need for judicial deference to agencies and,
simultaneously, the judiciary's oversight role.
In Bellotti v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 725 F.2d 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1983),
the Massachusetts Attorney General sought to intervene in a Commission proceeding modi-
fying Boston Edison's operating license for its Pilgrim nuclear power station. The NRC,
however, felt that it had the authority to set the scope of its hearings and that the Attorney
General had no right to intervene in the hearing. The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the NRC decision. Id. at 1383.
Courts are not prone to abdicate all responsibility to the NRC, however. The same court
that decided Bellotti ordered the NRC to hold a hearing under the same section of the
Atomic Energy Act, to consider the results of emergency preparedness exercises. Union of
Concerned Scientists v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 735 F.2d 1437, 1451
(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 815 (1985). No single factor accounts for when a
court must defer. Sometimes courts give a "hard look" at agency actions, other times they
merely give a "soft glance."
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United States Supreme Court, is chiefly responsible for the decen-
tralization of nuclear decision-making power.
Although several federal agencies171 have responsibility for nu-
clear power regulation, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and the Department of
Energy predominate. This Section highlights the federal develop-
ments during transition.
1. The Department of Energy
Of the three agencies, the Department of Energy has the least
direct impact on the daily regulation of nuclear power. Instead, the
DOE sets the tone for nuclear policy making in its role as informa-
Between 1982 and 1985, circuit courts have deferred to federal nuclear agencies on issues
such as rate base treatment of nuclear plant cancellations, Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co.
v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 730 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984); NRC hearing proce-
dures on decommissioning and waste storage, City of West Chicago v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 701 F.2d 632, 640-41 (7th Cir. 1983); pass-through of waste disposal costs to cus-
tomers, Towns of Concord, Norwood & Wellesley v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n,
729 F.2d 824, 830-31 (D.C. Cir. 1984); an NRC decision to take no enforcement action
against Indian Point, County of Rockland v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 709 F.2d 766, 776
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 993 (1983); and the NRC's granting of operating licenses to
the Diablo Canyon plant, San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 751 F.2d 1287, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1984), afl'd on reh'g, 789 F.2d 26 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
and the San Onofre plant, Carstens v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 742 F.2d 1546 (D.C. Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2675 (1985).
During the same period, however, circuit courts have not deferred to federal nuclear agen-
cies. That lack of deference is reflected by decisions ordering the NRC to hold a hearing on
the environmental qualification of certain safety-related equipment, Union of Concerned
Scientists v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 711 F.2d 370, 381 (D.C. Cir. 1983); ordering the
NRC to assess more thoroughly arrangements for medical services for contaminated per-
sons, Guard v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 753 F.2d 1144, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1985); rebuking
the NRC for closing a meeting to public participation on the TMI-1 restart, Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 727 F.2d 1195, 1203-04 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
rejecting the NRC rule eliminating electric utilities from demonstrating their financial qual-
ifications, New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 727
F.2d 1127, 1130-31 (D.C. Cir. 1984); and remanding FERC's order refusing to allow pass-
through of costs associated with permanent waste disposal when the basis for refusal was
unclear, Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 716 F.2d 52,
55-56 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
When considered together, these cases evince an unsettled attitude toward judicial defer-
ence to the expert agencies. Such an attitude is characteristic of post-TMI decentralized
policy making. See Tomain, Nuclear Regulation in Transition, supra note 3.
171. See generally, W. Fox, supra note 13, at ch. 2 & Part IV.
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tion gatherer for other government agencies. 17 2 The Department
was born from an oil crisis. Because of the interdependent charac-
ter of energy planning, the manner in which the DOE treats oil
also affects nuclear power. The perception of energy scarcity meant
that the country had to reduce its dependence on all oil, foreign as
well as domestic. The government targeted power plants, together
with large industrial oil consumers known as major fuel burning
installations, for oil cutbacks."'7 As plants converted from oil and
natural gas, they needed other fuels. Coal and nuclear were the
obvious alternatives. Consequently, the DOE was predisposed to
encourage the use of nuclear power as a way of relieving the pres-
sure on oil use.
Although the Department has not advocated a financial bailout
of the troubled industry, it has been an industry supporter. Under
Energy Secretary Hodel, the DOE committed itself to ensuring
that nuclear power continued to play an important role in securing
America's energy future. The Department saw nuclear power as
"critical" for a balanced energy mix, particularly because of its po-
tential to displace oil.17 4 To help reinvigorate the industry, the
DOE supported licensing legislation designed to shorten the con-
struction lead time and otherwise streamline the nuclear regula-
tory process as a means of reducing regulatory costs. 7 5
Even though the DOE has taken a pro-nuclear position by keep-
ing nuclear power in its energy plan, it has raised the industry's
costs through waste disposal legislation. The Department adminis-
ters the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982176 which imposes costs
on utilities even though the costs can be passed through to
consumers.
7 7
172. See Department of Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7133, 7135 (1982).
173. See Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8484 (1982).
174. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, THE NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY PLAN (1983).
175. U.S. Dep't of Energy News Release (May 8, 1984). The DOE also has introduced
legislation to streamline NRC regulatory procedures. Nuclear Licensing and Regulatory Re-
form Act of 1983, S. 894, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
176. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10226 (1982).
177. Title III of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 10222 (1982), establishes a
Nuclear Waste Fund that civilian power reactors fund at the rate of one mil per kilowatt
hour. These costs are passed on to ratepayers. Towns of Concord, Norwood & Wellesley v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 729 F.2d 824, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Iowa Elec. Light &
[Vol. 28:363
NUCLEAR TRANSITION
2. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has direct authority
over allocating cancellation costs for jurisdictional sales. FERC,
through Part II of the Federal Power Act, exercises regulatory, in-
cluding rate-making, jurisdiction over interstate purchases of elec-
tricity for resale.178 Like the majority of states, FERC has adopted
an accommodationist policy to cancellation expenses by splitting
costs between ratepayers and shareholders17 9 and by apportioning
responsibility for nuclear projects among participants.18 0 The Com-
mission also helps utilities with cash flow by allowing construction
work in progress in the rate base. FERC has adopted a rule which
allows partial recovery of construction work in progress. All con-
struction work in progress for pollution control facilities and fuel
conversion facilities may be given rate base treatment, as may fifty
percent of any other construction work in progress allocable to
electric power sales for resale.1 8"
3. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
The NRC has no formal rate-making authority. As the central
policy-making bureau, however, its rules and regulations directly
affect the costs of plant construction. The post-TMI period has
been especially turbulent for the NRC, so much so that the
agency's viability, as presently constituted, is seriously questioned.
Power Co., [State Transfer Binder 1983-1985] Util. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,347, at 57,720 (Iowa
Commerce Comm'n Mar. 26, 1984).
178. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824-824K (1982). The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has rate-
setting power over interstate wholesale sales of electricity, which is estimated to be 29% of
all electricity sales. See CBO STUDY, supra note 37, at 3. If utilities perceive federal regula-
tors to be more favorable than state regulators, the federal regulatory role may increase as
utilities establish subsidiaries or holding companies for interstate sales of electricity. Under
the doctrine of preemption, federal regulation of electricity supercedes state regulation. See
Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 106 S. Ct. 2349, 2356-57 (1986).
179. New England Power Co., [Federal New Matters Current] Util. L. Rep. (CCH)
13,005 (FERC Apr. 11, 1985), aff'd, [Federal New Matters Current] Util. L. Rep. (CCH) I
13,064 (FERC July 24, 1985).
180. Middle S. Energy, Inc., [Federal New Matters Current] Util. L. Rep. (CCH) 13,021,
at 18,998 (FERC 1985).
181. Mid-Tex Elec. Co-op, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 773 F.2d 327, 345-
47 (D.C. Cir. 1985); 18 C.F.R. § 35.26 (1984); 48 Fed. Reg. 24,323-358 (1983).
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Both the Kemeny"' and Rogovin 18 3 Commissions criticized the
agency for its preoccupation with licensing and its inattentiveness
to safety. Both recommended that the agency be reconstituted.
The NRC's immediate response to TMI was similar to everyone
else's-it became alarmed and began to tighten safety require-
ments. Both utilities and the Commission took safety inspections
more seriously. In addition, the NRC stepped up the number and
amount of fines.184 Another costly post-TMI regulation was the
NRC's adoption of emergency preparedness rules.""s Prior to TMI,
the NRC required utilities to submit on-site emergency plans. Al-
though off-site emergency planning was discussed before TMI, s
the need for such planning did not become apparent until shortly
after the accident when Pennsylvania Governor Thornburgh ad-
vised pregnant women and pre-school children to evacuate the area
within a five-mile radius of TMI. The NRC and the Federal Emer-
gency Management Agency issued a document providing guidelines
for state and local governments and nuclear facilities for develop-
ing emergency response plans.1 87 The NRC adopted final rules in
the summer of 1980 stating that it will not issue an operating li-
cense until it finds that reasonable assurance exists that adequate
protective measures can and will be taken in the event of radiologi-
cal emergency."ss Emergency preparedness requirements have been
costly, particularly to the Shoreham plant, which began construc-
182. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND, THE NEED FOR
CHANGE: THE LEGACY OF TMI 51-56, 61-67 (1979).
183. M. ROGOVIN, THREE MILE ISLAND: A REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONERS AND THE PUBLIC
(1979).
184. From 1973 to 1983, the number of fines increased from about five to 55 and were
reduced to about 22 in 1984. During these same periods, the amount of fines rose from
$100,000 to more than $4 million during the years 1973 to 1983, and receded to about $1.5
million in 1984. Data compiled from IE ENFORCEMENT STAFF, ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: SIGNIF-
ICANT ACTIONS RESOLVED NUREG: 0940 (1985) (copies on file with authors).
185. Irwin, State and Federal Roles in Emergency Planning (Sept. 21, 1984) (copy on file
with authors). This paper was delivered at the American Law Institute-American Bar Asso-
ciation seminar on Atomic Energy Licensing and Regulation, October 1984.
186. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, PLANNING BASIS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS IN SUPPORT OF LIGHT
WATER NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (1973).
187. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, CRITERIA FOR PREPARATION AND EVALUATION OF
RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS AND PREPAREDNESS IN SUPPORT OF NUCLEAR
POWER PLANTS (1980).
188. See 10 C.F.R. §§ 50.33, .47, .54, Part 50, App. E (1984).
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tion prior to the TMI incident. The NRC retroactively applied
these rules to Shoreham and, together with faulty emergency gen-
erators, they are chiefly responsible for Shoreham not being on-line
after nearly twenty years.189
The NRC's enthusiasm for emergency planning has waned, how-
ever. In two instances, the Commission attempted to circumvent
its own regulations and was checked by federal courts. 190 In other
areas the NRC has issued proposed decommissioning rules which
would require utilities to make available $100 million for the
decommissioning of each plant. 9" The Commission has also pro-
posed revisions to its back-fitting rules that may raise costs.192
During the transition, complacency has not been the watchword
at the NRC. Indeed, quite the opposite is true. Still, the NRC is
caught in the position of encouraging the safe development of nu-
clear power while shedding its promotional image and continuing
to license plants. Stepped-up safety inspections, increased fines
and penalties, costly back-fitting, emergency preparedness, and
decommissioning regulations reflect the NRC's activist interven-
tion into the construction and licensing processes. This interven-
tion is costly, however, and has caused turmoil in the industry. The
industry's instinctive reaction has been to attempt to minimize
regulatory costs. In response to critics who chided the NRC for its
prolonged regulatory lag, the NRC undertook a major internal re-
189. Long Island Lighting Co. v. County of Suffolk, 628 F. Supp. 654, 656-59 (E.D.N.Y.
1986).
190. The NRC adopted a rule that the Atomic Safety Licensing Board need not consider
the results of emergency preparedness exercises in its licensing hearings. This rule had the
effect of denying a hearing on emergency preparedness which, according to the Commis-
sion's own regulations, is material to issuance of a license. The reviewing court ordered the
NRC to conduct a hearing consistent with the Atomic Energy Act. Union of Concerned
Scientists v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 735 F.2d 1437, 1438 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In another
case, the NRC sought to avoid following its own regulation regarding "arrangements for
medical services." The court held that the NRC's interpretation of the rule-that the re-
sponse plan merely list existing facilities-was insufficent. Guard v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 753 F.2d 1144, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
191. 50 Fed. Reg. 5,600, 5,602 (proposed Feb. 11, 1985).
192. 10 C.F.R. § 50.109 (1985); see also the divergent replies to the proposed rules. 50
Fed. Reg. 38,097, 38,101-02 (1985).
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view by establishing the Regulatory Reform Task Force in 1981.
The Task Force issued a draft report on November 3, 1982.1
The draft report reflects the various pressures brought to bear
on the NRC to tighten the regulatory process in order to reduce
costs and step up licensing. Not surprisingly, the reactions to the
draft report can be aligned neatly, with utilities and industry inter-
ests opposed to intervenors and individual interests. These reac-
tions reveal the predicament that faces the NRC. In an effort to
follow its congressional mandate, and in reaction to the change in
public attitudes, the NRC increased its regulations with the direct
effect of raising costs to the industry. To offset rising regulatory
costs, the NRC attempted to tighten regulations. As a conse-
quence, the Task Force's suggestions lessen public participation in
the regulatory process. 94
State and federal regulation of nuclear power since TMI has
been anything but uniform. Power and authority has been decen-
tralized between federal and state governments. Within the federal
government, indications point to power being recentralized. With
the heightened public sensitivity to safety issues after Chernobyl
and the promulgation of a series of safety-conscious rules, however,
the recentralization effort has a long way to go. Furthermore,
within the states, decision makers are not resolving uniformly the
problems surrounding plant cancellations. The lack of uniformity
is characteristic of a developmental period.
The transition lacks uniformity because of the many competing
dualities. In fact, the traditional regulatory approach no longer
works. As the country looks to the future, however, it still must
solve the problems of the past. Although some may argue reasona-
bly that regulating utilities now according to a post-industrial com-
petitive market standard would be unfair because the recent regu-
latory scheme encourages utilities to invest in nuclear power, the
fact remains that overinvestment has occurred. In addition, impos-
ing the risks on ratepayers who had no hand in making investment
decisions is equally unfair. Accommodation, then, may be a tempo-
193. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGULATORY REFORM TASK FORCE, DRAFT REPORT
(November 1982); see also Green, Licensing Reform, in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE/AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, ATOMIC ENERGY LICENSING AND REGULATION (1985).
194. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Reform Task Force, supra note 193; see
also UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 4, at ch. 3.
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rary necessity, but it need not become a regulatory way of life.
Otherwise, past theory will guide future action when the underly-
ing facts do not conform theory and action. The transitional period
is the time to critique past theory, understand changes in present
circumstances, and design future policy.
IV. ANALYSIS OF NUCLEAR TRANSITION: TOWARD POST-INDUSTRIAL
REGULATION
A. Introduction
To this point, this Article has described the nuclear market, its
failure, and the decisions allocating the costs of mistaken nuclear
investment. Today, the country finds itself at the end of a transi-
tion characterized by uncertainty of policy, diversity of decisions,
and lack of cohesive theory, as demonstrated by a series of mutu-
ally exclusive dualities. Most cancellation decisions have been
made, few plants remain to be brought on line, and the economy is
rebounding. Electric utilities, nuclear and non-nuclear, are recover-
ing their financial health. America now has the experience and the
time for reassessing its commitment to, and regulation of, large-
scale, long lead-time, high technology power plants.
Analysis of the various dualities reveals the existence of three
regulatory models-the Traditional Model, the Transitional
Model, and the Post-Industrial Model. Given nuclear market fail-
ure and the unsatisfactory regulatory responses under the Tradi-
tional Model, a choice favoring the Post-Industrial Model becomes
clear. Slowing demand for electricity, excess capacity, rising nu-
clear costs, co- and self-generation, declining or reversing econo-
mies of scale, decentralized decision making, and slowing and
problematical technological improvements in the nuclear industry
indicate the emergence of a more competitive market for nuclear
power. Utilities, such as Pacific Gas and Electric, seeking rate de-
creases and giving preferential treatment to large consumers cor-
roborates the presence of competition.195 Finally, a more competi-
tive environment also is confirmed by the actions of public utilities
195. See, e.g., P.G.&E. Seeks to Cut Rates Average of 12%, Wall St. J., Mar. 21, 1986, at
4, col. 3; Pacific Gas & Electric asked the California Public Utilities Commission for per-
mission to reduce by an average of 12% the rates it charges its customers, Wall St. J., Apr.
9, 1986, at 47, col 4.
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commissions that have attempted to reformulate rate making to
conform to a more market based system. 9 "
B. Regulatory Models
Figure 1 outlines the characteristics of the three regulatory mod-
els used in this Article.
Figure 1
Models of Nuclear Policy and Regulation
TRADITIONAL TRANSITIONAL
POST-
INDUSTRIAL
Dates
Energy supply
Plant Construction
Decision-making
authority
Bureaucratic
model
Decision-making
fora
Rate making
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pation
Policy support
1946-1979
High technology,
Large scale
Capital expansive
Centralized,
Federal
Elitist,
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Agencies, (NRC,
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DOE)
Rate base
Circumscribed
Uniform
1979-1986
Mixed
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Cancelled
Dualistic,
Federal/State
Adversarial,
Contentious
Courts
Accommoda-
tionist
Contentious,
Factious
Diffuse
1986-
Competitive,
Alternative
sources
Scaled down,
Standardized
Decentralized
Federal/State/
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Democratic
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tion, Mediation)
Market-based,
Deregulation
Participatory
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196. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
418 [Vol. 28:363
1987] NUCLEAR TRANSITION
The models should now be familiar. The Traditional Model, pro-
moting nuclear power, defines the hard energy path.197 It conceives
of energy supply as large scale, high technology, capital expansive,
and necessary for both industrial and economic growth and social
well-being. The characteristic regulatory structure of this model is
government sponsored, elitist, specialized, centralized, and techno-
cratic, with little need for public participation. Public participation
is viewed as inefficient and ineffective. 198 Instead, expert federal
197. A. LOVINS, supra note 30, at 26-28.
198. See, e.g., Green, Public Participation in Nuclear Power Plant Licensing: The Great
Delusion, 15 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 503 (1974). In assessing current NRC reform proposals,
Professor Green does not see any increase in effective public participation:
Eleven years ago I wrote that public participation is at best a charade and at
worst a sham. Nothing has happened in the intervening years to change my
views. Public participation gives ordinary citizens and citizen groups the op-
portunity to retain counsel, employ nuclear experts, and become parties in ad-
versarial, quasi-judicial hearings. The concept of public participation evolved
after the fact to characterize and rationalize the phenomenon that numerous
intervenors availed themselves of a statutory right to a hearing in licensing
proceedings in order to harass, impede, and hopefully obstruct specific nuclear
power projects. It was not a case of Congress or AEC/NRC saying "let there be
public participation" and then providing adversary hearings to achieve this ob-
jective. Quite to the contrary, the nuclear power establishment blundered its
way into public participation which, on its face, is a "motherhood" issue that is
generally regarded as politically infeasible to eliminate.
Public participation masks a more fundamental malaise. Intervenors expend
their money, energy, emotions, and time in contesting nuclear power projects
in adversary hearings only because they lack confidence in the government reg-
ulators. They stubbornly refuse to accept as adequately safe what the regula-
tors certify as adequately safe. They assume the responsibility for doing the
job they believe the regulators are not doing. And because their intervention
overtly attacks the integrity of the regulatory process, the regulators must fight
back to defend themselves, only further convincing the intervenors and their
friends that the regulators are incompetent, untrustworthy, and in cahoots
with the industry they are supposed to regulate. The entire structure is like a
self-destructing perpetual motion machine.
Moreover, the intervenors can accomplish very little, if anything. Their re-
sources-financial and technical-are only an infinitesimally small fraction of
those available to the applicant and the NRC. They simply do not have the
competence to make any real contribution to greater safety. To exacerbate the
problem, the NRC's procedures are carefully rigged to let the intervenors blow
off steam while at the same time curbing their ability to achieve their objec-
tives. The result is frustration, alienation and suspicion which only serves to
exacerbate the political woes of nuclear power.
Green, supra note 193, at 240-41 (footnote omitted); see also P. NAVARRO, supra note 99, at
105-07.
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administrative agencies are the primary decision makers. The eco-
nomic incentive structure comes in the form of direct government
support through legislation that gives private industry access to
nuclear materials, 199 invests in research and development, 00 and
limits the financial exposure of participants in the nuclear ven-
ture.20 1 The Traditional Model creates a nuclear market that
would not otherwise exist. Because government wanted technologi-
cal improvement, industry wanted profits, and the consuming pub-
lic wanted cheap energy, the market created by this model had le-
gitimacy. The nuclear market is an artificial construct, however,
and is susceptible to destabilization when political and economic
structures change. This destabilization has occurred as the finan-
cial market ceases investing and as public support decreases, thus
eroding the legitimacy of the Traditional Model.20 2
The Transitional Model is less a model than a state of tempo-
rary destabilization. Although energy supply continues during this
period, the traditional sources of supply are questioned, resulting
in the delay and cancellation of nuclear plants. The commitment
to large-scale, high technology plants is on hold, particularly as the
energy supply is supplemented by co-generation, self-generation,
and alternative sources. Decision making is decentralizing, moving
from the federal to the state governments. Courts are increasingly
second-guessing and overturning or delaying agency actions.203
This court activity evinces a breakdown in political support as not
only intervenors, but shareholders, utilities, contractors, vendors,
architects, and engineers seek judicial relief from the financial con-
sequences of nuclear market failure.0 4 It also demonstrates dissat-
199. 42 U.S.C. § 2073 (1982).
200. 42 U.S.C. § 2051 (1982).
201. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1982).
202. See J. CAMILLERI, THE STATE AND NUCLEAR POWER. CONFLICT AND CONTROL IN THE
WESTERN WORLD 107-32, 274-93 (1984).
203. One commentator has been critical of courts that second-guess nuclear policy deci-
sions. See Yellin, High Technology and the Courts: Nuclear Power and the Need for Insti-
tutional Reform, 94 HARv. L. REv. 489 (1981).
204. As recently as November 1979, one prominent litigator wrote, "There are no decided
cases setting out broad rules governing litigation about the construction of nuclear facilities.
The controversies which have gone to litigation have been settled or are now sub judice."
Evans, Construction Litigation Involving Nuclear Facilities, in PLI, NUCLEAR LITIGATION
203 (1979). Today, utilities are bringing multi-million dollar lawsuits against architects, en-
gineers, reactor vendors, and construction contractors. Heiden, Construction Litigation In-
[Vol. 28:363
NUCLEAR TRANSITION
isfaction with elitist bureaucratic decision making. If the public
voice is not heard at the agency, then the court is another forum.
During the transition, society is also questioning the pro-nuclear
incentive structure. Many view government subsidy of the industry
as dangerous to health and safety, and the traditional rate-making
formula as inadequate to handle the allocation of plant cancella-
tion costs. The result is a series of regulatory accommodations im-
posing losses among consumers, shareholders, and taxpayers. The
accommodationist response is built on cost allocation decisions
that do not honor uniformly the connection between policy-making
responsibility and financial liablity.s0 5
Just as the shift toward decentralized decision making from
agencies to courts and from the federal government to the state
legislatures is evidence of political change, a corresponding eco-
nomic change also emerges as the rising price of electricity from
large scale plants encounters increased competition. The artifice of
the nuclear market is exposed by the substitution of electricity
from other suppliers, thus replacing the state-created nuclear mar-
ket with a less regulated, more competitive market.
The Post-Industrial Model relies on electricity supplied from
several sources. Central power stations no longer serve as the pre-
eminent supplier. For nuclear power, this fact means that scaled-
down, standardized plants rather than megaplants stand a better
chance of competing against other suppliers.20 6 No uniform pro-
nuclear policy exists. Instead, nuclear policy is factious, even be-
tween industry and government.0 7 The public is suspicious of
plant safety, knows that nuclear power is not cheap, and realizes
volving Nuclear Power Plants, in PLI, NUCLEAR LrrIGATION 307 (1984). Shareholders are
suing managers for breach of fiduciary duty, see Rubin v. Dickhoner, No. C-1-83-1721 (S.D.
Ohio, filed Feb. 21, 1984) (certified for class action, Apr. 15, 1985) and customers are suing
utilities to prevent cost pass-through, County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 554 F.
Supp. 339 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
205. Tomain, Law and Policy in the Activist State, supra note 3, at 212-34.
206. See Tanguy, Safety and Nuclear Power Plant Standardization: The French Experi-
ence, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Oct. 31, 1985, at 20, 25.
207. Government most likely will raise the cost of doing nuclear business through increas-
ing industry exposure under the Price-Anderson Act, see Price-Anderson Act Amendment
Act of 1985, Hearing before the Subcomm. on Energy Research and Development of the
Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), and through
more costly regulations, as discussed in section I1-C of this Article, supra notes 170-94 and
accompanying text.
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that safety and finances present real tradeoffs. °0 The bureaucratic
mode of decision making is democratic and participatory, rather
than technocratic and elitist.20 9 This reformulation of the role of
agencies does not mean that experts have no place in administra-
tive decision making. Rather, experts gather and interpret positive
scientific data, and politically accountable decision makers make
policy recognizing that normative uncertainty pervades nuclear de-
cision making.21 0 Decision making will continue to be decentralized
between the states and the federal government, and among the
states. Correlative with the change in bureaucratic thinking is a
move toward a wider range of dispute resolution alternatives. In
addition to courts and agencies, community-based and interest-
based bargaining will take place, utilizing negotiation, mediation,
and arbitration as viable alternatives to litigation and administra-
tive hearings. 211 Finally, the nuclear market in the Post-Industrial
Model is both more competitive and less state-supported than ei-
ther of the other models. Although the state will continue to moni-
tor safety, it will not subsidize financial matters.
These three models describe the characteristics of regulatory pe-
riods. A closer examination of the Transitional Model reveals the
contours of future nuclear law and policy.
208. See, e.g., Nuclear Agency Calls Cost Pinch a Possible Factor in Ohio Reactor Acci-
dent, N.Y. Times, July 23, 1985, at B16, col. 1; Safety Rules and Laxity Cited as Driving up
Reactor Costs, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1984, at Al, col. 3.
209. See D. YATES, BUREAUCRATIC DEMOCRACY: THE SEARCH FOR DEMOCRACY AND EFFI-
CIENCY IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 113 (1982) ("I offer a simple theoretical proposition: the
more inclusive the participation in bureaucratic segments, and the more competitive their
environment, the more closely the bureaucracy will conform to the norms of pluralist
democracy.").
210. Nuclear decision making is both positive and normative as well as economic and
political. Because it has these attributes, the use of nondemocratic, bureaucratic decision
making is misplaced. See W. LOWRANCE, OF ACCEPTABLE RISK. SCIENCE AND THE DETERMINA-
TION OF SAFETY 102-126 (1976); C. PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK
TECHNOLOGIES 15-61, 304-352 (1984).
211. See, e.g., NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, REGULATORY NEGOTIATION
ISSUE (January 1986); Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEo. L.J. 1, 7
(1982); Petrulis, NRRI Report: Commissions Use Negotiated Settlements to Expedite Reg-
ulatory Process, 6 NRRI Q. BULL. 379 (Oct. 1985).
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C. Transitional Dualities
The nuclear transition Was discontinuous as it moved from one
period-or model-to another. The series of dualities mentioned
throughout this Article represent the discontinuities present dur-
ing transition. These dualities, without being forced, do not align
themselves perfectly with either the Traditional Model or the
Post-Industrial Model during this period. Instead, the dualities ex-
ist as justifications for the use of decision makers in their decision
making. The dualities, listed in Figure 2, serve the heuristic pur-
pose of exposing the rhetorical devices and argumentative strate-
gies used by decision makers.
Figure 2
Transitional Dualities
Traditional Model
Goals and Objectives
Bureaucratic model
Argumentative perspectives
Constituency
Public Participation
Cost allocation
perspective
justification
test
Long-term Efficiency Short-term Equity
Long-term Efficiency
Economic Growth
Managerial
Ex ante
Quantitative
Shareholder
Mechanistic
Systemic
Service obligation
Prudent management
Post-Industrial Model
Short-term Equity
Political participation
Democratic
Ex post
Nonquantitative
Consumers
Pervasive
Project-specific
Market risk distribution
Used and useful
Although Figure 2 aligns the dualities, the alignment is forced.
The Traditional Model, for examplq, favors long-term efficiency
and market mimicking as ways to maximize wealth and economic
growth. During the transition, however, the Traditional ideology,
which supports the continuance of large central power stations,
must achieve its ends through short-term financial fixes and loss
1987]
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allocation based on ex post argumentation. Similarly, proponents
of the Post-Industrial ideology, who favor short-term equity, avail
themselves of long-term efficiency arguments during the transition.
Both postures mix ideological elements. Such mixing is consistent
with a radically changing market structure, a lack of well-devel-
oped theory, and transitional decision making.
Pure versions of the Traditional and Post-Industrial Models
would align the dualities as they are described in Figure 2. The
Traditional Model would treat nuclear policy from an ex ante per-
spective and would formulate a long-term, systemic, nuclear pro-
gram in order to maximize efficiency and economic growth. The
Traditional Model would consist of elite bureaucratic decision
making with minimal public participation and would justify share-
holder protection as a means to wealth-maximizing ends. Likewise,
the Post-Industrial Model would attempt to create a policy moti-
vated by political participation, and would concern itself with
short-term, project-specific decentralized decision making. Equity
would serve as the decisional rule for the ex post protection of con-
sumers-those persons in the worst position to protect themselves.
The transitional dualities betray a lack of theory for cost alloca-
tion, indicate a change in direction for nuclear policy, and expose
the values missing from the Traditional Model to reveal the config-
uration of the Post-Industrial Model. The dualities suggest a cri-
tique of the Traditional Model and present an opportunity to re-
construct a more responsive regulatory approach. This backward-
forward examination of nuclear law and policy should prove sturdy
enough to suggest regulatory reforms if the future reforms emanate
from past practices, thus providing stability between regulatory
regimes.
Developing a list of concrete reform proposals is both easier and
harder than might be suspected. Inventing specific reforms proves
easy because they are limitless. 12 Dealing with specific reforms,
212. Specific examples of reform at the federal level would include: abolishing the NRC;
creating an independent safety body; establishing a separate licensing agency with a sepa-
rate appeals board or eliminating administrative appeals; relying on "hard look" judicial
review; repealing the Price-Anderson Act; and creating a federal Office of Public Advocate
that would provide expertise and funding for intervenors. At the state level, concrete re-
forms would include restructuring the rate-making formula to avoid cost-plus pricing; ex-
tending legislative ventures into the nonradiological side of nuclear regulation; funding in-
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however, is hard because a forty-year-old mind-set 213 favoring nu-
clear power and a century of large scale electricity regulation must
be broken. Explicitly identifying and articulating the fundamental
values of the transition thus becomes necessary. Simply put, nu-
clear power is stalled because the regulatory system cut itself off
from the market and was not sensitive to politics. Until one ad-
dresses these issues at a normative level, no reform effort will
work.
The Traditional Model broke down because it curtailed partici-
pation and attenuated responsibility in decision making. Nuclear
policy during this period unwisely depended on a market of its own
creation and on highly centralized decision making. Such depen-
dence aggravated the disparity between policy-making responsibil-
ity and financial liability. Furthermore, the artificial nuclear mar-
ket and the transitional relief that decision makers provided
through a series of accommodations distorted normal market risks
and contained inefficient incentives. Recognizing the underlying
values of participation, decentralization, competition, and respon-
sibility is imperative for sound regulatory reform.
The nation can begin to ascertain the regulatory future by tak-
ing the following steps: aligning the mutually exclusive dualities;
describing their consistencies; generating sets of reforms; deciding
on a way of choosing between sets; choosing between sets; then,
designing concrete reforms consistent with the chosen set. The
evaluative test for choosing between opportunity sets is responsive-
tervenors; and encouraging interstate and state-federal participation in such issues as waste
disposal, nuclear transportation, and emergency planning. These proposals, standing alone,
are not novel and are easily generated. They also are consistent with the critique because
they are based on increased participation and increased decentralization aimed at a closer
alignment of responsibility and liability. As such, they coincide with the Post-Industrial
Model.
One also can fashion an alternative set of reforms, consistent with the Traditional Model.
At the federal level, Traditional Model reforms would include streamlining licensing as per
the Task Force report; renewing Price-Anderson; circumscribing public participation; sup-
porting standardization financially; and promoting the development of a national power
grid. At the state level, reforms would encompass continuing the use of cost-based rate mak-
ing; giving greater judicial deference to public utilities commissions; lowering the standard
for prudency findings; eliminating proxy advocates; and increasing the expertise of public
utilities commissions by appointing commissioners and expanding technical staff.
213. See UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 4, at ch. 6; Maleson, The Historical
Roots of the Legal System's Response to Nuclear Power, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 597, 610 (1982).
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ness: Does the chosen reform or set of reforms respond to the cri-
tique? If the choice is wisely made, then legitimacy follows.
The opportunity sets are clear. Bluntly put, the choice is be-
tween the Traditional Model of elitist, technocratic, nuclear regu-
lation and the Post-Industrial Model of participatory, decentral-
ized regulation. These models are mutually exclusive ways of
looking at the world. They are regulatory ideologies. The Tradi-
tional Model is a vision of an end-state where nuclear power neces-
sarily plays a part of our energy future. The Post-Industrial Model
is a state of second best. Because more than one energy policy will
compete for the nation's attention, nuclear power may or may not
be part of the post-industrial world. Nuclear power may play a role
if political and market circumstances are such that politically re-
sponsive and accountable decision makers choose nuclear energy
through democratic participatory processes. Nuclear power could
reemerge if industrial growth demands it, or, what is more likely, if
smaller and more standardized plants become cheaper to build
than coal plants.
Policy options under the Post-Industrial Model reflect tensions
between politics and markets, power and money, and equity and
efficiency. The competing policies are given voice through decision-
making processes that require participation before legitimacy at-
taches. The outcome and future depend less on a vision of the best
end-state than on a decision-making and policy-making process
that yields a realignment of responsibility and liability through re-
sponsive regulation. If nuclear power reemerges, the reemergence
will be the result of public choice, not of industry-government
edict.
V. CONCLUSION
During the transition, regulatory agencies provided relief to the
nuclear industry, improving the utilities' cash flow and apportion-
ing investment losses among ratepayers, shareholders, and taxpay-
ers. This relief was not economically defensible. It was inefficient
because it encouraged overinvestment and sent wrong signals
about risks and incentives. It also protected, at least partially, poor
investment and poor managerial choices, encouraged waste, and al-
located risks to persons-ratepayers-in the worst position to pro-
tect themselves.
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The transition, however, should be politically understandable as
a period of regulatory shakeout. Regulators were forced to confront
drastic market changes, institutionalized pro-nuclear and pro-large
scale electricity policies, anachronistic rate-making methodologies,
and dramatic shifts in regulatory politics. They also confronted a
fundamental question: Should the country maintain its century-
long commitment to large-scale, high technology plants as the pre-
eminent source of electricity? The transition disclosed the com-
plexities of this question and helped begin to formulate an answer.
The transition serves as a bridge between two models and an op-
portunity for policy development. It activated the dynamic part of
bureaucratic government during which corrective action takes
place, thus relegitimizing policy choices. Even when the transition
was rough, it released the fetters of a past, and here, mistaken,
policy that has been institutionalized by law.214
The implication of legal transition for the interaction of law and
policy is that an allegiance to unitary or end-state policy positions
is unnecessary and unwise. Instead, one should recognize that a
policy-making process, and the role and rule of law in that process,
are constitutive of a policy that attempts to mediate conflict and
give voice to varied interests rather than dominance to some.215
Mediation of competing claims through the political process be-
comes the hallmark of legitimate policy making and decision mak-
ing in the modern state."' Democratic and pluralistic participation
in policy making is accorded priority as both economic and politi-
cal values co-exist and compete.
The inescapable consequence of the interaction of law and policy
is that political values are implicated in the regulatory order. It
can be no other way. The legitimacy of the regulatory state de-
pends on acceptability and accountability. As long as decision
makers maintain their accountability to their various constituen-
cies and the public accepts their decisions, stability results. Still,
destablizing events can occur. The rejection of a promotional nu-
214. Tomain, supra note 9, at 722-23.
215. See generally A. HIRSCHMAN, Exrr, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970) (discussion of a man-
ner of analyzing social processes that illuminates a wide range of economic and political
issues).
216. See A. WILDAVSKY, SPEAKING TRUTH TO PowER. THE ART AND CRAFT OF POLICY ANAL-
YSIS 114-40 (1979).
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clear power policy by financial markets in the mid-1970s, and the
disenchantment of the general public after TMI, are prime exam-
ples of such events. Destabilization, however, need not be perma-
nent and the country need not experience a continuous legitima-
tion crisis as long as a transition can occur during which reforms
develop that are responsive to the public's assessment of the desta-
bilizing events and to its critique of past policy.
The primary lesson of the nuclear transition is that radical
changes in politics and markets produced a series of mismatches in
nuclear policy making. The mismatches were accommodated, not
cured, through regulatory and judicial compromises. Although they
are not held together by a coherent economic model or a clear pol-
icy reference, the accommodations represent a temporary "balanc-
ing" of interests. The transitional balancing allows the legal/policy-
making system to shake out regulatory discontinuities and allows
policy paradigms to transform and reconstruct. The existence, pur-
pose, and effect of the Transitional Model is consistent with gov-
ernment in a pluralistic democracy and is consistent with the
traditional liberal theory of law and politics as applied in the ac-
tivist bureaucratic state.217 The Transitional Model provided a cri-
tique of Traditional regulation and a preview of Post-Industrial
regulation. Whether the country will travel the path responsive to
the critique remains to be seen.
217. B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 1-6 (1984); G. ALPEROVITZ & J. FAUX,
REBUILDING AMERICA 173-91, 257-71 (1st ed. 1984); B. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PAR-
TICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 261-312 (1984); W. GORMLEY, supra note 128, at 181-
218; D. YATES, supra note 208, at 180-205; Tomain, Constructing a Way Out of the Liberal
Predicament (Book Review) 1985 A.B.F. RES. J. 345, 356-57; see also Macneil, Bureaucracy,
Liberalism and Community-American Style, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 900, 947-48 (1984-85);
Stewart, Regulation in a Liberal State: The Role of Non-Commodity Values, 92 YALE L.J.
1537, 1538-39 (1983).
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APPENDIX
Regulatory and Judicial Treatment of
Nuclear Plant Cancellation Costs
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STATE DECISION CITATION DATE PLANT U. REQ.
AZ Arizona Public 38 PUR4th 547 80 Palo Verde 1 20,079,000
Service Comm'n
CA San Diego Gas & 31 PUR4th 435 79 Sundesert 90,300,000
Electric Co.
CA Southern Ca. 50 PUR4th 317 82 Vidal
Edison Co.
CT Ct. Light & Power Ns. 810602, 81 All costs
Co. 810604
CT United 55 PUR4th 252 83 Pilgrim II 14,700,719
Illuminating Co.
CT United 64 PUR4th 319 84 Seabrook 2/ 18,700,000
Illuminating Co. Pilgrim II annually for 10
yrs/4,889,640
DC Potomac Electric 29 PUR4th 517 79 Douglas Point 54,240000
Power Co.
DC Ananheim v. 669 F.2d 799 81 Vidal/ 0/547,000
FERC Huntington
Beach
DC Jersey Central 730 F.2d 816 84 Forked River 397,000,000
Power & Light Co. v.
FERC
FL Gulf Power Co. 43 PUR4th 15, aff'd, 81 Caryville 10,768,052
GPC v. Crease, 410 (Unamortized
So.2d 492 (1982) balance)
ID WA Water Power 65 PUR4th 100 85 Skagit/Hanford 3,565,000 per
Co. year for 5 years
IL Union Electric Co. 53 PUR4th 565 83 Callaway II Total: 46,600,000
(5,070,000 from IL
ratepayers)
IN Citizen's Action 485 N.E.2d 610 85 Baifley N-1 190,746,580
Coalition v. NIPSCO
10 Iowa Power & 51 PUR4th 405 83 Vandalia
Light Co.
MA Commonwealth 47 PUR4th 229 82 Montague I + 1,465,000/
Electric Co. II/Pilgrim II 7,581,000
NUCLEAR TRANSITION
AMT. ALLOW AMT. DIS. RATE BASE OPER. EXP. ROR (%) AMORT. PER. COST C/E (M)
0 All costs denied Denied Denied 8.75 0 15
84,540,000 AFUDC excluded Unamortized 84,540,000 10.59 5 14.5
(5,100,000) balance (Direct
denied costs)
Costs as OE 12.65 16
denied
No recovery after
Comm'n determines
project "ill advised"
7,350,359 0 Denied Direct costs 13.16 2 16.4
(annually) allowed
14,700,000 Unamortized Denied Direct costs 14.37 10
annually/ balance allowed/Full
3,667,230 denied amt. allowed
30,000,000 Denied land Unamortized Direct costs 9.03 10 12.75
held for balance allowed
future use denied
0/547,000 Vidal disallowed 12.75
as OE / HB
allowed
Unamortized Unamortized Direct costs 12.62 15 19
balance balance allowed
denied denied
10,768,052 0 Unamortized Direct costs 5
(Unamortized balance allowed denied
balance) (10,768,052)
4,623,000 total Costs after Dec. Denied Direct costs 12.097 15 14.9
(50/50 split 31,1981 denied allowed
SHa + RPa) (11,154,000) (4,623,000)
663,000 for test All uncertain Denied All direct costs 11.9 5 15.5
year costs denied allowed (including
carrying costs)
0 All costs denied Denied Denied 0
0 All costs denied Denied Denied 10.88 0 15
1,351,000/ Equity AFUDO Denied/Denied Direct costs 11.91 3.2 15.5
5,307,000 denied/No recovery allowed/same
after 7/80
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STATE DECISION CITATION DATE PLANT U. REQ.
MA Boston Edison Co. 46 PUR4th 431 82 Pilgrim II 278,300,000
MA Fitchburg Gas + 52 PUR4th 197 83 Montague I + II 196,443/
Electric Light Co. /Pilgrim II 906,641 (Costs to
7/1/80)
ME Bangor Hydro 46 PUR4th 503 82 NEPCO units 354,408 (Annually)
Electric
ME Central Maine 57 PUR4th 488 83 Pilgrim II 14,500,000
Power Co. (9,661,238 direct
costs; 4,851,762
ME ME Public Service 67 PUR4th 101 85 Seabrook 2 11,200,000
Co.
MI IN & MI Electric Case N. U-6148 81 Breed Project 11,433,077
Co.
MI Detroit Edison Co. 52 PUR4th 318 83 Greenwood II + 71,000,000
I1 (19,000,000 in
AFUDC)
MN Northern States 46 PUR4th 110, 81 Tyrone Energy 75,000,000 (35
Power afrd 690 F.2d 674 Park mill. in costs; 40
(8th Cir. 1982) mill. in unset. Ks)
MN Northern States 42 PUR4th 339 81 Tyrone/Sherco 10,928,000 (test
Power 4 year
request)/800,000
MO Union Electric Co. 57 PUR4th 169 83 Callaway II 84,000,000 (22
mill. in costs; 10 mill.
AFUDC; 52 mill. in K
MO Kansas City EO-85-185, 86 Wolf Creek 194,700,000
Power & Light Co. EO-85-224,
25,036
MT Pacific Power & 53 PUR4th 24 83 Pebble Springs 970,000 /
Light Co. /WPPSS V 1,055,000
NC Carolina Power & 49 PUR4th 188 82 Harris Units III 53,748,000
Light Co. + IV
NC Duke Power Co. 49 PUR4th 483 82 Perkins 5,119,000
NC Carolina Power & 55 PUR4th 582 83 Harris III + IV
Light Co.
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AMT.ALLOW AMT. DIS. RATE BASE OPER. EXP. ROR (%) AMORT. PER. COST C/E (%)
82,100,000 74,200,000 (Eq. Denied 12,700,000 (cost of 10.94 13
AFUDC + exp after service recovered
July 1, 1980) denied with ROE of 14%)
175,056/ All equity AFUDC Denied/Denied Direct costs 13.68 3 16.3
536,770 denied (21,387)/ allowed (Costs of
same (55,781) Service)/Same
282,456 All equity AFUDC Denied Direct costs 13.71 5 16.4
(Annually) denied (71,952) allowed
(282,456)
0 All costs denied Denied Denied
Prudent costs Unamortized Direct costs 3.6 16.5
allowed balance allowed
(5,644,451) allowed
All costs denied Denied Denied 9.93 0 13.5
Deferred 10
to decision
U-6949
40,000,000 Unsettled Denied Direct costs 5
plus settled K claims allowed
K claims denied
0/800,000 All costs denied Denied for Denied for test 9.73 0.3 13.5
for Tyrone both plants year/Sherco costs
allowed
decision decision Costs denied
deferred deferred
78,200,000 126,000,000 (due 78,200,0 allow- 11.75 7 15
to imprudent ed in yearly per-
management) entge inceases
0 All costs denied Denied 0
Direct costs Long term debt of 11.57 10 14.5
allowed unamort. balance
allowed (?,65,%00)
5,119,000 Unamortized Direct costs 11.98 5 15.5
balance allowed
denied
Prudently Unamortized Direct costs 11.38 10
invested costs balance allowed
allowed "denied
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STATE DECISION CITATION DATE PLANT U. REQ.
NH Public Service 60 PUR4th 17 84 Pilgrim II 15,926,729
Comm'n of NH
NJ Jersey Central 44 PUR4th 54 81 Forked River 413,700,000
Power & Light Project
NJ Utility Construction No. 8012-914 82 Hope Creek II
Plans: Hope Creek II
NJ Atlantic City 51 PUR4th 109 83 Hope Creek II
Electric Co.
NY Rochester Gas & 45 PUR4th 386 82 Sterling All costs except
Electric Co. interest charges
NY Central Hudson 67 PUR4th 459 85 Sterling
Gas & Electric Co.
OH Toledo Edison Co. 42 PUR4th 568 81 Davis Besse II
+111, Erie I + II
OH Toldeo Edison Co. 46 PUR4th 589 82 Davis Besse II 6,996,000
+ III (Common
property)
OH Cleveland Electric 46 PUR4th 63 82 Davis Besse II 56,437,000 (amt.
Illuminating Co. + III, Erie I remaining from
+ II 1980 case)
OH Dayton Power & 45 PUR4th 549 82 Killen Unit I
Light Co.
OR Pacific Power & 49 PUR4th 82 82 Pebble 48,994,000/
Light Co. Springs/ 60,596,000
WPPSS V
PA PA Pub. Util. 52 PUR4th 644, 83 Davis Besse II 34,697,389
Comm'n. v. aff'g 51 PUR4th 198 + III, Erie I
Duquesne Light + II
PA PA Electric Co. 502 A.2d 130 85 TMI ItFMI II
v. PA Pub.
Util. Comm'n.
SD Black Hills Power 46 PUR4th 391 82 Osage
& Light Co.
TX Houston Lighting 50 PUR4th 157 82 Allen Creek I 361,100,000
& Power Co. + II
NUCLEAR TRANSITION
AMT. ALLOW AMT. DIS. RATE BASE OPER. EXP. ROR (%) AMORT. PER. COST C/E (%)
none All costs Option of ROR
denied increase
225,389,000 AFUDC after Unamortized Direct costs 10.68 15
plant cancelled balance allowed
denied denied
172,185,000 Unamortized Allowed 15 16
balance
denied
Direct Unamortized Allowed 11.7 15 15
expenses balance
allowed denied
38,600,000 Amounts Carrying charges 5
(prudently allocated to allowed on
incurred costs) other utilities unamort. balance
Direct costs Direct costs 12.84 5 15.7
allowed allowed
24,553,550 Unamortized Denied 11.44
balance denied
(24,553,550)
0 All costs Denied Denied 13.09 0 17.86
denied
Allowed After 1982, Option to Disallowed 12.25 15 17.3
1981-1982 amortized increase (after OCC v.
amortization amt. amt. denied ROR OH PUC)
0 All costs Denied 12.11 0 16.44
denied
Decision Decision 12.54 17.07
delayed delayed
One yr. amortization Unamortized Direct costs 11.64 10 16.14
period allowed balance allowed
(3,469,739) denied
0 All costs Denied 0
denied
All costs Unamortized 11.12 5 14.5
allowed balance
denied
195,000,000 enied costs after Unamortized Direct costs 12.63 10 16.85
Jan. 1, 1980 balance allowed
(166,000,000) denied
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STATE DECISION CITATION DATE PLANT U. REQ.
VA VA Electric & 29 PUR4th 65 79 Surry III + IV 60,348,000
Power Co. (4,548,000
AFUDC)
VA VA Electric & 44 PUR4th 46 81 North Anna IV
Power Co.
VA VA Electric & 48 PUR4th 327 82 Surry III + IV
Power Co. + North Anna IV
VA VA Electric & 54 PUR4th 1 83 Surry III + IV/ 50,000 per year/
Power Co. North Anna IV 68,000 per year
VT Central Vt. Pub. 49 PUR4th 372 82 Pilgrim II 8,200,000 total
Serv. Corp. (2,531,000 AFUDC
5,669,000 dir.
WA WA. UtiL & Tranap. 51 PUR4th 158 83 Pebble 10,594,000
Comm'n. v. Pacific Springs/
Power & Light WPPSS V
WA WA Util. + Tranp. 54 PUR4th 480 83 Pebble Springs
Comm'n. v. Puget
Sound Power & Light
WA People's Org. Wash. 679 P.2d 922 84 WPPSS III 20,174,000
Energy Res. v.
SWUTC
WA WA Util. + Tranp. 62 PUR4th 557 84 Skagit/Hanford 178,136.875
Comm'n. v. Puget
Sound Power & Light
WI Wis. Public 52 PUR4th 389 83 Koshkonong
Serv. Comm'n.
WY Pacific Pwr. & Light 677 P.2d 799 84 WPN 4,5/
v. Public Service Pebble Springs
Comm'n.
NUCLEAR TRANSITION
AMT. ALLOW AMT. DIS. RATE BASE OPER. EXP. ROR (%) AMORT. PER. COST C/E (%)
Direct costs Denied Unamortized Allowed 9.63 10 13.5
allowed 9,743,000 balance denied
(No AFUDC) + all AFUDC (26,831)
All costs Unamortized Allowed 10.68 10 15
(including balance
AFUDC) denied
Allow Unamortized Direct costs 15 15.5
recovery of balance allowed
senior equity denied
Direct costs Unamortized Direct costs 10.92 10 16.25
balance denied allowed
for both plants
1 yr. amort. Unamortized Direct costs 12.53 10 16
period allowed balance allowed
(820,000) denied
Option to Denied 13.01 0 185
add 2.5%
to ROR
4,749,000 All AFUDC denied Unamortized Direct costs 12.63 10 16.25
(for test after March 12, balance denied allowed
year) 1980 (47,546,000)
0 All costs Denied Denied 0
denied
Costs before June, Costs after June, Unamortized Direct costs 12.74 10 16.25
1980 adjusted: 1980 including balance allowed
81,750,284 AFUDC: 49,572,069 denied
530,400 Allowed 11.09 1 15
(for test
year)
0 All costs Denied Denied
I denied I I I I I
1987]

